Optimal quality effort strategy for the service supply chain of live streaming e-commerce based on platform marketing efforts

Dec. 21,2021
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It is proposed in the Government Work Report that new forms of business such as e-commerce and online services play an important role in China’s fight against COVID-19. More supporting policies are to be launched in succession. Continued poverty relief efforts are to be made by consuming products and services from poverty-stricken areas. The Internet Plus strategy should be steadily promoted on all fronts. New strengths for the digital economy should be developed. Live streaming e-commerce creates a brand new socialized business marketing mode for traditional e-commerce. It improves the sales conversion rates of online products and services, providing traditional e-commerce with access to more profit-seeking opportunities. However, in the wake of the rapidly developing live streaming e-commerce, plenty of quality-related problems have surfaced. For example, the flowers promoted by a Chinese Internet celebrity Luo Yonghao ended up being rotten ones. For another example, some service providers offer nothing but slogans or empty talks. So, enacting a sound service quality effort strategy to optimize the profits of the members of the live streaming e-commerce service supply chain bears theoretical and practical significance.

Streamers and live streaming service platforms constitute vital components of live streaming e-commerce. Whether a streamer signs a contract with a live streaming service platform has a critical bearing on the service quality efforts of the streamer and the platform. In light of this, the research team led by Xing Peng with Liaoning University built members’ profit functions for both situations of signing and not signing a contract. Moreover, with the goal of profit maximization, the optimal quality effort strategy for the supply chain members and their optimal profits were obtained by using the game theory. The results show that the optimal service quality efforts of a contracted streamer and a platform are both higher than those in the absence of a contract. Once a streamer signs a contract with a platform, the latter tends to strive to promote the contracted streamer and make more efforts to improve platform service quality. Correspondingly, the contracted streamer will also work harder to improve his/her service quality.

Through simulation analysis, this paper discussed the effects of a streamer’s commission proportion and the cut a live streaming service platform takes on the optimal strategy for the service supply chain and its optimal profit. In both cases, the service quality effort of the streamer increases with the streamer’s commission proportion but decreases with the cut the live streaming service platform takes. In contrast, the service quality effort of the live streaming service platform increases with both the streamer’s commission proportion and the cut the live streaming service platform takes.

Relevant research, that is, the Quality Effort Strategies for Live Streaming E-commerce Supply Chain based on Block-chain Technology is being externally reviewed by International Transactions in Operational Research, a journal registered in SSCI/SCI. The above research is funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the Science Research Program of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province, and the Liaoning Provincial Social Science Planning Foundation. The research findings are published in the journal Control and Decision (http://kzyjc.alljournals.cn/kzyjc/article/abstract/20220122).

Corresponding Author: XING Peng
Email: xingpeng1026@126.com
CNKI Press Officer: LI Jingjing YANG Na
Email: ljj6806@cnki.net yn6791@cnki.net

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