Corporate governance, equity structure and food safety information disclosure
(2.School of Management, Xiamen University)
【Abstract】Food safety information disclosure has become the hotspot of regulators, practitioners and researchers recently. Based on the data of 137 listed food corporations at the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in 2011–2015, this paper examines the effect of corporate governance on food safety information disclosure by taking the food safety disclosure level as measurement index. It finds that the better the corporate governance practices, the higher the level of food safety information disclosure is. The empirical study indicates that the proportion of independent directors, executive shareholding ratio, executive remuneration ratio and ownership concentration have a significant positive effect on food safety information disclosure. Further analysis shows that with different equity structures, corporate governance also has different effects on food safety information disclosure. In state-owned enterprises, the combined title of board chair and general manager has a significant positive effect on food safety information disclosure, but this effect displays in a negative way in non-state-owned holding enterprises. Furthermore, the executive remuneration ratio in state-owned enterprises is found to play a more significant effect on food safety information disclosure than in non-state-owned enterprises, while the executive shareholding ratio in non-state-owned enterprises is found to play a more significant effect on food safety information disclosure than in state-owned enterprises.
【Keywords】 corporate governance; equity structure; food safety; information disclosure;
. ① http://www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/index [^Back]
. ② http://www.gtarsc.com [^Back]
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