Influence of crowding-out effects of compound governance on performance of marketing channels for agricultural products: taking the mode of agricultural leading enterprises plus farmers as an example
(2.Hubei Rural Development Research Center)
【Abstract】The mode of agricultural leading enterprises plus farmers in the marketing channels for agricultural products has such problems as high default rate, low stability and poor performance. From the perspective of farmers and theories related to the mechanism of governance, this paper conducted an empirical analysis on the influence of crowding-out effects of compound governance on the performance of marketing channels for agricultural products through 578 copies of survey data on farmers from six provinces, such as Hainan Province, Hubei Province, and Henan Province. According to studies, in Chinese trading market of agricultural products, there were Channel Compound Governance I based on traditional governance with social regulations and formal contractual governance as well as Compound Governance Channel II based on relational governance and formal contractual governance. The crowding-out effect of traditional governance with social regulations on formal contractual governance had a negative influence on stability of the mode of agricultural leading enterprises plus farmers, while the crowding-out effect of relational governance on formal contractual governance had a positive influence on stability of the mode of agricultural leading enterprises plus farmers. Besides, the legal awareness of farmers led to a significantly negative adjustment to the relationship between the crowding-out effect of Compound Governance Channel I and stability of channels. However, it led to a significantly positive adjustment to the relationship between the crowding-out effect of Compound Governance Channel II and stability of channels. Besides, stability of marketing channels for agricultural products had a direct influence on the improvement of elastic performance and sales performance of transactions.
【Keywords】 agricultural leading enterprises plus farmers; marketing channels; compound governance; crowding-out effects; performance;
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