Social trust, the relationship network and peasant households’ participation in the supply of rural public goods

CAI Qihua1 ZHU Yuchun1

(1.College of Economics & Management, Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University)

【Abstract】Based on micro-data of 1024 peasant households in three provincial regions of Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Shandong, this paper takes small-scale farmland water conservancy facilities as an example, uses the sample selection model, and empirically analyzes the effects of social trust and the relationship network on peasant households’ participation in the supply of rural public goods. It shows that the peasant households that are willing to participate in the supply of small-scale farmland water conservancy facilities account for 65% of the total, 68% of which choose to participate in the supply by the way of investment. Social trust and the relationship network play a significant role in promoting farmers to participate in the supply, and make peasant households tend to participate in the supply by the way of labor input. Among various variables in social trust and the relationship network, general trust significantly promotes peasant households’ willingness in participating in the supply, and makes peasant households tend to participate in the supply by the way of labor input; however, special trust has an opposite effect on the supply, which is not significant. General network significantly promotes peasant households’ willingness in participating in the supply, and makes peasant households tend to participate in the supply by the way of labor input, while the kinship network has a significant prohibitive effect on peasant households’ willingness in participating in the supply, but does not have a significant impact on peasant households’ ways of participation in the supply. Further marginal effect analysis shows that an increase of 1 level of social trust leads to an increase of 6.9% of the probability that peasant households are willing to participate in the supply, and a decrease of 6.4% of the probability that they choose to participate in the supply by the way of investment; and an increase of 1 level of the relationship network leads to an increase of 4.9% of the probability that peasant households are willing to participate in the supply, and a decrease of 5.5% of the probability that they choose to participate in the supply by the way of investment.

【Keywords】 social trust; relationship network; peasant households’ participation; rural public goods; supply;

【DOI】

【Funds】 Project of National Natural Science Fundation of China (71273210) New-Century Talent Support Program of the Ministry of Education (NCET-13-049) Special Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education (20130204110033) Basic Scientific Research Fund for the Central Universities (2013RWZD01) Program of Soft Science in Shaanxi province (2011KRM130)

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(Translated by ZHONG Yehong)

    Footnote

    [1]. ①Quoted from Opinions On Relevant Policy of Standardizing and Guiding Farmers’ Labor Input and Investment on the Construction of Small-scale Farmland Water Conservancy Facilities that Farmers Can Directly Benefit by Office of Panel of Countryside Taxation Reform of the State Council (Office of Panel of Countryside Taxation Reform of the State Council, No. 16 (2005)). [^Back]

    [2]. ②The calculation formula of social trust factor is: tr = (0.4054 × tr_1 + 0.3811 × tr_2)/0.7865, in which tr represents social trust, tr1 represents special trust, and tr2 represents general trust. [^Back]

    [3]. ③The calculation formula of relationship network factor is: nw = (0.4681 × nw_1 + 0.3178 × nw_2)/0.7796, in which nw represents the relationship network, nw1 represents the kinship network, and nw2 represents the general network. [^Back]

    [4]. ①Due to the relative larger correlation coefficients of social trust and relationship network, in order to avoid strong multicollinearity, the paper does not introduce the both at the same time for the empirical analysis. [^Back]

    [5]. ①The calculation formula for the marginal effect of participation willingness is:∂E(yi2)|z/∂z) = ø(z'β)β, and the calculation formula for the marginal effect of participation mode is: ∂E(yi1|x/∂x) = ø(x'α)α. [^Back]

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This Article

ISSN:1002-8870

CN: 11-1262/F

Vol , No. 07, Pages 57-69

July 2015

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Article Outline

Abstract

  • 1 Introduction
  • 2Theoretical analysis and model construction
  • 3 Data sources and variable description
  • 4 Estimated results and the interpretation
  • 5 Marginal effect analysis and the robustness test
  • 6 Main conclusions and policy implications
  • Footnote

    References