Do cooperatives promote family farms to choose environmental-friendly production practices: an empirical analysis of fertilizers and pesticides reduction

CAI Rong1 WANG Ziyu2 QIAN Long DU Zhixiong3

(1.College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University)
(2.Center for Food Security and Strategic Studies, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics)
(3.Rural Development Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

【Abstract】Under the background of resource and environment constraints, whether and how family farms can coordinate the sustainable development of agriculture and environment have become major practical problems. Taking the fertilizers and pesticides reduction behavior as an example, this paper uses the national monitoring data of family farms and builds a “counterfactual” framework based on an econometric analysis model to evaluate the treatment effects of cooperatives on the probability of fertilizers and pesticides reduction. The study finds that the proportion of family farms that reduce the application of fertilizers and pesticides is still low. Cooperatives have positive impacts on the adoption of environmental-friendly production practices. Compared with non-members, cooperative members can increase the probability of fertilizers and pesticides reduction by 43.3% and 43.7%, respectively. In addition, differences in services and benefits obtained from cooperatives can partly explain family farms’ different treatment effects of joining cooperatives. Finally, the study provides three policy suggestions.

【Keywords】 family farm; cooperative; environmental-friendly production practice; treatment effect;

【DOI】

【Funds】 National Natural Science Foundation of China ( 71773044) National Natural Science Foundation of China (71803077) the Ministry of Agriculture (2014T2017)

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(Translated by MA Shujun)

    Footnote

    [1]. ① Whether the chemical fertilizer application is reduced or not is taken as the explained variable and exclusive constraint variable, while the other controlling variables are taken as the explaining variables, meanwhile, by using Probit model regression, it is found that the coefficient of exclusive constrain variable is −0.194, and the corresponding p value is 0.290. Whether the pesticide application is reduced or not is taken as the explained variable and exclusive constraint variable, while the other controlling variables are taken as the explaining variables. Meanwhile, by using Probit model regression, it is found that the coefficient of exclusive constrain variable is −0.139, and the corresponding p value is 0.425. [^Back]

    [2]. ① Explaining variables include the variable whether to join the cooperative or not, and other controlling variables. In order to save space, the model regression results are not listed herein. [^Back]

    [3]. ② The cmp command can be used for estimation in STATA software. [^Back]

    [4]. ρ12 and ρ13 are the residuals of the equation whether to reduce the application or not; the correlation between the residuals of the equation whether to reduce the application of pesticide or not is the residual difference and chemical fertilizer amount of the equation whether to join the cooperative or not; ρ23 is the residual of the equation whether to reduce the application of chemical fertilizer or not and the correlation coefficient of the residual of the equation whether to reduce the application of pesticide or not. [^Back]

    [5]. ② exp (1.072) − 1 ≈ 1.92. [^Back]

    [6]. ③ exp (0.794) − 1 ≈ 1.21. [^Back]

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This Article

ISSN:1006-4583

CN: 11-3586/F

Vol , No. 01, Pages 51-65

January 2019

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Article Outline

Abstract

  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Theoretical analysis
  • 3 Data source and descriptive statistics
  • 4 Econometric model specification and variable selection
  • 5 Empirical results analyses
  • 6 Conclusions and policy suggestions
  • Footnote

    References