(2.江南大学食品安全与营养协同创新中心, 江苏无锡 214122)
【摘要】针对关于我国生鲜农产品供应链未来发展模式的争论, 利用不对称纳什谈判模型来刻画合作社与超市间的交易过程, 分析社区直销店的开设对于合作社和超市双边决策的影响, 进而比较单一“农超对接”模式和超市、社区直销店并存的双渠道模式的运作效率。论文研究发现:相比于单一“农超对接”模式, 合作社在双渠道模式下的利润水平会提高, 而超市的利润水平会降低;合作社的谈判能力越是弱势, 其在双渠道模式下的利润增幅会更加显著;当合作社的设计规模较大时, 生鲜农产品供应链在双渠道模式下的运作效率将能得到显著改善。同时, 用数值仿真验证了模型分析的结果。
【基金资助】 国家自然科学基金面上项目 (71371086) ; 国家社会科学基金重大项目 (14ZDA069) ; 国家社会科学基金项目 (16BJY185) ;
The operational efficiency measurement of agro-food supply chains: the single “farmer-supermarket direct purchase” vs. dual channel
(2.Synergetic Innovation Center of Food Safety and Nutrition, Wuxi, China 214122)
【Abstract】An agricultural cooperative is an association of farmers who voluntarily cooperate to pool their production for sales. In China, the agricultural cooperatives are increasingly encouraged to sell their fresh agricultural products to supermarkets, and supermarkets hold a significant market share in agricultural product distribution from farms to final consumers. However, some of agricultural cooperatives still prefer to sell a part (or all) of their production directly to end consumers. In practice, many farmers combine direct selling and marketing through cooperatives. They sell part of their production to the cooperatives and the rest is sold directly to consumers. The combination of direct selling with supermarkets gives rise to a particular market structure for the agricultural cooperatives. The purpose of this paper is to study whether it is necessary for the cooperatives to establish community outlet stores to sell fresh agricultural products to consumers directly. A model in which an agricultural cooperative is owned by many farmers who produce a homogeneous good is built. It is assumed that the supermarkets and the direct selling market are separated. The supermarkets are oligopolistic, but the price of fresh agro-food in the direct selling market is controlled by the government. The agricultural cooperative decides on the production quantity and how to share this production the supermarkets and the direct selling market. A Nash bargaining model is developed to analyze the game process between the cooperative and the supermarket. The equilibrium results are derived and the resulting profit sensitivity with respect to some factors is analyzed. Our analysis stresses three important results. First, it is find that the cooperative will benefit from the opening of the community outlet store; however, the profit of supermarket will decrease. Second, as the bargaining power of the cooperative decreases, the degree of improvement for the cooperative’s profit will become more significant. Finally, the operational efficiency of the whole supply chain can be improved significantly in the dual channel when the production capability of the cooperative is greater than a threshold. Simultaneously, a numerical simulation is proposed to prove the results. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it is an attempt to build a theoretical framework for a agricultural cooperative to decide on how to share production between the supermarkets and the direct selling market. Second, the results of this paper can provide implications for the government in China to develop more efficient agricultural supply chains.
【Keywords】 agro-food supply chain; “farmer-supermarket direct purchase”; community outlet stores; dual channel; asymmetric Nash bargaining;
【Funds】 National Natural Science Foundation of China (71371086); National Social Science Fund of China (14ZDA069); National Social Science Fund of China (16BJY185);
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