渠道模式、努力投入与生鲜农产品供应链运作效率研究
(2.江苏食品安全研究基地, 江苏无锡 214122)
(3.Jiangsu Food Safety Research Base, Wuxi ,China 214122)
【摘要】归纳总结我国生鲜农产品供应链三种主要渠道模式的特征和内涵,对比分析不同渠道模式下的生产努力投入、销售努力投入以及供应链效用水平。研究结果表明:(1)农户的风险规避偏好是影响其选择不同渠道模式的关键因素;(2)当农户的风险规避程度较低时,农户应该选择采用自产自销模式,此时的生产努力投入和销售努力投入也较其他模式下更高。而当农户的风险规避程度较高时,加入“农超对接”供应链不仅有利于增进农户效用,而且也能提高生产努力投入和销售努力投入;(3)相比于松散型“农超对接”模式,紧密型“农超对接”模式是一种更优的选择,能够同时提高农户和超市双方的效用水平。
【关键词】 生鲜农产品供应链; 模式选择; 农超对接; 努力投入;
【DOI】
【基金资助】
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ISSN:1003-207X
CN: 11-2835/G3
Vol 23, No. 12, Pages 105-112
December 2015
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