The impact of relational contract stability on the supply chain of fresh agricultural products: from the perspective of subsidy modes for cold chain facilities

XIONG Feng1,2 PENG Jian1 JIN Peng2 ZHANG Xiangyang2 QIU Yun2

(1.School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, Hubei Province 430073)
(2.Ningbo University, Ningbo, Zhejiang Province 315211)

【Abstract】Due to the influence of the product characteristics and mode of operation between upstream and downstream of the supply chain of fresh agricultural products, there are many problems such as the weakness of contracts stability and the serious waste of agricultural products. Therefore, it would be of vital significance to explore the stability of contracts from the angle of reducing agricultural products’ wastage. Through building a profit model under two different organizational modes and considering the factor of costs, the article analyzes the impact of introduction of cold chain facilities under relational contracts on the freshness of agricultural products and benefits of participants in the supply chain. It concludes that relational contracts and the appropriate subsidies for agricultural cooperatives from government play a significant role in promoting the freshness of agricultural products and profits of the whole supply chain, which results in the relational contracts stability in the supply chain of fresh agricultural products eventually. Certain references for studying stability of the agricultural product supply chain and quality of agricultural products in the future are provided.

【Keywords】 freshness of agricultural product; relational contract; negotiating capacity; agricultural product supply chain;


【Funds】 National Natural Science Foundation of China (71173123) Humanities and Social Sciences Fund of Ministry of Education (11YJC630233) Soft Science Program of Hubei Province (RKF2015000209) Humanities and Social Sciences Fund of the Department of Education, Hubei Province (13g061) Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (20132YB039) Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Program of Zhejiang Province (10CGGL11YBQ)

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(Translated by ZHANG Wei)


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This Article


CN: 11-2835/G3

Vol 23, No. 08, Pages 102-111

August 2015


Article Outline


  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Problem description and assumptions
  • 3 Impacts of relational contracts on fresh agricultural product supply chain and the conditions for “self-execution”
  • 4 The impacts of cold chain facilities on the operation of the supply chain of fresh agricultural products
  • 5 Analysis of the impacts of different methods of providing subsidies for cold chain facilities on the stability of relational contracts
  • 6 Conclusion
  • References