【摘要】自2017年8月开始, 特朗普政府重新开启了美国在经贸领域“敲打中国”的大幕。现有研究虽准确把握了美国敲打中国的战略考量, 但我们还需从美国敲打日本的历史中寻找镜鉴。美国敲打日本源于后者经济崛起带给它的“权力转移”恐慌, 采用的策略是通过实施关税调查、发起货币谈判、达成构造协议、动用“301条款”和超级“301条款”等手段, 将自身市场优势与相对于日本的竞争劣势“关联”起来。当今的中国与昔日的日本既有相同之处, 又存在诸多不同。为避免重蹈日本当年的覆辙, 中国需重点做出3个方面的战略回应:保持战略定力、坚守战略底线;借力“一带一路”, 积极拓展对外经贸合作新空间;加大对研发活动的资金和政策支持力度, 并坚定不移地贯彻实施国家知识产权战略。
【基金资助】 国家社科基金一般项目“国际公共产品供给与美国霸权地位维系研究” (16BGJ036) ; 吉林大学哲学社会科学研究重大课题培育项目“‘一带一路’的货币地理与人民币国际化战略研究” (2018ZDPY02) ;
Can history repeat itself? Contemporary lessons from the United States bashing Japan
【Abstract】Since August 2017, the Trump administration reopened the curtain of U.S. bashing China in economic and trade fields. The extant studies point out U.S. strategic considerations of bashing China; however, China still needs to draw lessons from the history of U.S. bashing Japan. The reason for U.S. bashing Japan is that U.S. was afraid of “power transfer” resulting from Japan’s economic rise. To effectively bash Japan, the U.S. “linked” its market advantage with Japanese competitive disadvantage via means such as carrying out tariff investigations, implementing monetary negotiation, agreeing on Structural Impediments Initiative, and initiating Section 301 and Super 301. Nowadays China shares a lot with Japan, but it is also different from Japan in some aspects. To avoid Japan’s strategic failure, China needs to respond strategically to U.S. bashing. First, it should keep its own strategic principles and uphold its own strategic baseline. Second, it should positively expand new space of economic and trade cooperation by means of the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, it should continue to support funds and government policy for research and development activities, and meanwhile, firmly carry out national intellectual property strategy.
【Keywords】 trade disputes; power transfer; linkage strategy; monetary negotiation; national security;
【Funds】 General Project of National Social Science Fund of China (16BGJ036); Key Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research, Jilin University (2018ZDPY02);
. ① The US members of the working group consist of officials from the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Japanese members of the working group include officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Treasury, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Economic Planning Agency. [^Back]
. ① In July 1992, Japan and the United States held another meeting to confirm the implementation effect of the agreement. The Japanese side indicated that it would further correct exclusive business practices and simplify government procurement procedures, and the US promised to reduce fiscal deficits. During the Clinton administration, the United States strengthened its offensive against Japan with the aim of expanding the shares of different varieties of goods in the Japanese market. In July 1993, the two parties signed an agreement called the United States-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership, calling for two meetings a year to jointly resolve structural and sectoral issues and reduce the US trade deficit with Japan. During the Bush administration, a bilateral framework mechanism called U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth was launched, and further efforts were made to improve the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan. See Zhu, Y. Japanese Studies (日本学刊), (3): 47–59, (2007). [^Back]
. ② In March 1987, the Reagan administration imposed a 100% punitive tariff on USD 300 million worth of chip products exported to the US by Japan for the dumping behavior of Japanese companies and the Japanese government’s failure to honor the US companies’ share of the Japanese chip market by more than 10%. In June 1991, the United States and Japan reached a new semiconductor trade agreement for a period of five years. The United States hoped that the share of foreign semiconductor products in the Japanese market would exceed 20% by the end of 1992. Japan regarded “20%” as the direction of efforts, while the United States required this as the “contract” of both parties. In July 1996, the Japan-U.S. Semiconductor Trade Agreement expired, and the two sides agreed to adopt a new approach; on the one hand, establishing a forum for the meeting of government officials—Government/Authorities Meeting on Semiconductors, and on the other hand forming a forum for the semiconductor industry—World Semiconductor Council. [^Back]
. ① According to foreign analysis, CFIUS was reluctant to release the transaction because of concerns that China has the ability to acquire Cree’s technology through Infineon. See Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. CFIUS in 2017: A Momentous Year. [2018-06-06]. https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDF-Search/CFIUS-Report/2017/CFIUS-YIR-2017.pdf [^Back]
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