历史能重复自身吗——美国敲打日本的当代镜鉴

李俊久1

(1.吉林大学经济学院, 吉林长春 130012)

【摘要】自2017年8月开始, 特朗普政府重新开启了美国在经贸领域“敲打中国”的大幕。现有研究虽准确把握了美国敲打中国的战略考量, 但我们还需从美国敲打日本的历史中寻找镜鉴。美国敲打日本源于后者经济崛起带给它的“权力转移”恐慌, 采用的策略是通过实施关税调查、发起货币谈判、达成构造协议、动用“301条款”和超级“301条款”等手段, 将自身市场优势与相对于日本的竞争劣势“关联”起来。当今的中国与昔日的日本既有相同之处, 又存在诸多不同。为避免重蹈日本当年的覆辙, 中国需重点做出3个方面的战略回应:保持战略定力、坚守战略底线;借力“一带一路”, 积极拓展对外经贸合作新空间;加大对研发活动的资金和政策支持力度, 并坚定不移地贯彻实施国家知识产权战略。

【关键词】 贸易争端; 权力转移; 关联策略; 货币谈判; 国家安全;

【DOI】

【基金资助】 国家社科基金一般项目“国际公共产品供给与美国霸权地位维系研究” (16BGJ036) 吉林大学哲学社会科学研究重大课题培育项目“‘一带一路’的货币地理与人民币国际化战略研究” (2018ZDPY02)

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    脚注

    [1]. (1) 美方工作组成员由来自国务院、财政部、商务部和经济咨询委员会的官员组成, 日方工作组成员则由来自外务省、大藏省、通产省、企划厅的官员组成。 [^Back]

    [2]. (1) 又被称为“日美构造协议”。1992年7月, 日美再次举行会议对该协议的实施效果进行确认, 日方表示将进一步纠正排他性的商业行为、简化政府采购手续, 美方承诺削减财政赤字等。克林顿执政时期, 美国以逐项扩大不同品种的商品在日本市场的份额为目的, 强化了对日本的攻势, 双方于1993年7月签署名为“美日新经济伙伴框架”的协定, 要求每年举行两次会议, 共同解决结构和部门问题, 以减少美国对日贸易逆差。小布什政府时期启动了名为“实现增长的美日经济伙伴”的双边框架机制, 进一步谋求改善美国对日本的贸易不平衡问题。参见:朱颖.日美经贸关系的新变化[J].日本学刊, 2007 (3) :47-59。 [^Back]

    [3]. (2) 1987年3月, 里根政府以日本企业存在倾销行为以及日本政府没有兑现让美国企业获得日本芯片市场10%以上的份额为由, 向日本出口美国的价值3亿美元的芯片产品征收100%的惩罚性关税。1991年6月美日达成新的半导体贸易协议, 为期5年, 美国希望1992年年底以前外国半导体产品在日本市场上的份额能超过20%。日本将“20%”作为努力方向, 美国则要求以此作为双方的“约定”。1996年7月日美半导体贸易协议期满, 双方同意采用一个全新的方式, 一方面建立了政府官员会面的论坛——政府和当局半导体会议 (Government and Authorities Meeting on Semiconductors, GAMS) , 另一方面组建了半导体行业的论坛——世界半导体理事会 (World Semiconductor Council) 。 [^Back]

    [4]. (1) 有国外分析认为, 因担心中国有能力通过英飞凌公司获取科锐公司的技术, CFIUS不愿放行此项交易。参见:Wilson Sonsini Goodrich&Rosati.CFIUS in 2017:A Momentous Year[R/OL].[2018-06-06].https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/CFIUS-Report/2017/CFIUS-YIR-2017.pdf。 [^Back]

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This Article

ISSN:1000-355X

CN: 22-1065/F

Vol 37, No. 04, Pages 1-14

July 2018

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Article Outline

摘要

  • 一、问题的提出
  • 二、为何敲打日本:美国的“权力转移”综合征
  • 三、如何敲打日本:美国的“关联”策略
  • 四、中国与日本的异同及启示
  • 脚注

    参考文献