Constructing “community of shared destiny” between China and Latin America: necessity, possibility and challenge

HE Shuangrong1

(1.Department of International Relations Studies of Institute of Latin American Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

【Abstract】Building a “community of shared future for mankind” is one of China’s new ideas and practices promoted by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CPC) since the 18th National Congress of CPC. It is consistent with the trend of human social development. It is not only China’s “world dream” and the policy statement of China’s path of peaceful development, but also a new practice of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. Latin America is an important partner for China to build a community of shared destiny. Since the 21st century, the economic and trade relations between China and Latin America have made leap-forward development, and the interests of both sides have been increasingly merged. China and Latin American countries have initially built up a community of shared destiny for mutual development. With the development of bilateral economic and trade relations and the expansion of personnel exchanges, non-traditional security issues, including smuggling, drug trafficking and organized crimes, have increasingly become common security issues affecting both sides. The rise of emerging developing countries and the increasing global challenges have made the two sides become a political community of shared destiny that promotes the establishment of new international relations and the transformation of the system of global governance. However, due to the restructuring of the economic structure of China and Latin America, the world political and economic uncertainty, the United States factors and changes in the identity of China and Latin America, China and Latin America are faced many challenges to build the community of shared destiny. In the face of challenges, China should maintain its strategic strength and patience to build the community of shared destiny for common progress with Latin American countries.

【Keywords】 community of shared destiny; Sino-Latin American relations; development benefits; global governance;

【DOI】

【Funds】 Major Project of National Social Science Foundation in 2015 (ZDA067)

Download this article

    Footnote

    [1]. ① Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2014-7-19). [^Back]

    [2]. ② Hu, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (1) (2012-11-18). [^Back]

    [3]. ① Pei, C. & Lin, J. Seeking Truth (求是), (9): 59 (2006). [^Back]

    [4]. ② Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2015-9-29). [^Back]

    [5]. ③ Ruan, Z. International Studies (国际问题研究), (1): 9–10 (2016). [^Back]

    [6]. ④ Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2013-3-24). [^Back]

    [7]. ① Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (1) (2013-1-30). [^Back]

    [8]. ② Guo, S. Chinese Journal of European Studies (欧洲研究), (5): 30 (1998). [^Back]

    [9]. ③ Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2013-3-24). [^Back]

    [10]. ④ Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2014-5-16). [^Back]

    [11]. ① Wang, Y. International Studies (国际问题研究), (4): 2 (2013). [^Back]

    [12]. ② Wang, Y. People’s Tribune (人民论坛), (4): 23 (2014). [^Back]

    [13]. ③ http: //www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cero/chn/zgyw/t1329037.htm [^Back]

    [14]. ④ Xi, J. Beijin Youth Daily (北京青年报), (2014-7-15). [^Back]

    [15]. ⑤ http: //news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878944.htm [^Back]

    [16]. ① ECLAC, “The People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean Dialogue and Cooperation for the New Challenges of the Global Economy”, October 2012, p. 27. http: //www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/8/48138/ChinayALCdialogo.pdf.[2016-05-13] [^Back]

    [17]. ② OECD/ECLAC/CAF, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Towards a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015, p. 158. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en. [2016-05-15] [^Back]

    [18]. ① Wang, L. http: //www.yicai.com/news/5005672.html.[2016-05-16] [^Back]

    [19]. ②ECLAC, “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean”. http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/0/43290. [2016-05-16] [^Back]

    [20]. ③ OECD/ECLAC/CAF, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Towards a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015, p. 158. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en. [2016-05-16] [^Back]

    [21]. ④ Zhao, M. People’s Daily (人民日报), (3) (2015-1-10). [^Back]

    [22]. ① Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (1) (2014-4-16). [^Back]

    [23]. ① http: //www.chyxx.com/news/2016/0414/405760.html [^Back]

    [24]. ② OECD/ECLAC/CAF, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Towards a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015, p. 98. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en. [2016-05-18] [^Back]

    [25]. ③④ BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016 (Chinese version) (BP世界能源统计年鉴2016 (中文版)), 6,18 (2016). [^Back]

    [26]. ① http: //www.chyxx.com/news/2010/1111/125165.html [^Back]

    [27]. ② “Why Don’t the Chinese Come to Latin America?”, in Tourism Review, May 5, 2014. [^Back]

    [28]. ③ CAF, “Poruna América Latina Más Segura: Una Nueva Perspectiva para Prevenir y Controlar el Delito”, 2014, pp. 22–23. [^Back]

    [29]. ④ Inés Bustillo and Helvia Velloso, “Insecurity and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean”, in PRISM, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2015, p. 49. [^Back]

    [30]. ① “Police Implement New Security Measures for Chinese Nationals”, The Gleaner, August 28, 2013. http: //jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20130828/lead/lead55.html. [2016-05-20] [^Back]

    [31]. ② R. Evan Ellis, “China’s Geo-economic Role in Latin America”, The World Economic Forum, January 2016. http: //www.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Geoeconomics_with_Chinese_Characteristics.pdf.[2016-05-20] [^Back]

    [32]. ③David Gagne, “Rising Dragon? The Chinese Mafia Threat in Latin America”, in Sight Crime, 15 October 2014. http: //www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/rising-dragon-the-chinese-mafia-threat-in-latin-america.[2016-05-22] [^Back]

    [33]. ④R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America”, in PRISM, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012. [^Back]

    [34]. ⑤ Gustavo Carabajal, “En Cinco Anos, la Mafia China Cometió 31 Asesinatosen el País”, en LANACION, 2 de septiembre de 2014. [^Back]

    [35]. ⑥ “Desarticulamos una Organización que Extorsionaba a Comerciantes Chinos”, Ministerio de Seguridad Presidente de la Nación, junio 13, 2016. http: //www.minseg.gob.ar/desarticulamos-una-organización-que-extorsionaba-comerciantes-chinos. [2016-05-22] [^Back]

    [36]. ⑦ Li, W., Zhang, L. et al. Global Times (环球时报), (2006-5-15). [^Back]

    [37]. New Business (新商报), (2012-10-7). [^Back]

    [38]. ② Emma Rosser, “China ‘Unlikely’ to Repatriate Jailed Colombian Drug Mules”, July 30, 2015. [^Back]

    [39]. ③ http: //www.nncc626.com/2016-02/18/c_128731173_3.htm [^Back]

    [40]. ④ William R. Brownfield, “U.S. Efforts to Advance Civilian Security in Central America’s Northern Triangle”, U.S. Department of State, June 17, 2016. http: //www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258635.htm. [2016-05-22] [^Back]

    [41]. ⑤ The drug trafficking syndicate established in Mexico in 2009, mainly acting in Jalisco. [^Back]

    [42]. ⑥ Arron Daugherty, “Colombians Charged in Massive China-based Money Laundering Scheme”, in Insight Crime, September 11, 2015. http: //www.insightcrime.com/newsanalysis/Colombians-charged-china-drug-money-laundering-scheme. [2016-05-23] [^Back]

    [43]. ⑦ Julieta Pelcastre, “‘El Chapo’ Conspires with Chinese Mafias to Produce Synthetic Drugs in Latin America”, El Dialogo, February 19, 2014. http: //dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2014/02/19/Sinaloa-alianza-china. [2016-05-23] [^Back]

    [44]. ⑧ Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2014-5-16). [^Back]

    [45]. ⑨ Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2013-3-24). [^Back]

    [46]. ① Wang, Y. People’s Daily (人民日报), (7) (2016-5-31). [^Back]

    [47]. People’s Daily (人民日报), (3) (2015-1-10). [^Back]

    [48]. Seeking Truth (求实), (18): 9–10 (2014). [^Back]

    [49]. ④ [Cuba] Francisco, L. 全球化与世界体系 (上). Bai, F. et al. (trans.) Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 211 (2003). [^Back]

    [50]. ① “Brazil’s Foreign Policy under Lula”, in Latin American Special Report, May 2004. [^Back]

    [51]. ② Monica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Rethinking Global and Domestic Challenges in Brazilian Foreign Policy”, in Jorge I. Domínguez and Ana Covarrubias(eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World, Routledge, 2015, p.146. [^Back]

    [52]. ③ [Cuba] Francisco, L. 全球化与世界体系 (上). Bai, F. et al. (trans.) Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 247 (2015). [^Back]

    [53]. ④ CEPAL, “Strengthening the Role of the UN in Global Governance”, September5, 2011. http: //www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/strengthening-role-un-global-governance. [2016-05-24] [^Back]

    [54]. ⑤ Wang, C. Nankai Journal (Philosophy, Literature and Social Science Edition) (南开学报(哲学社会科学版)), (6): 55 (2012). [^Back]

    [55]. ⑥ Argentine scholar Carlos Calvo made an initiative in 1868 to oppose European countries in the name of protection of foreigners and to intervene in other countries, which was written in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American) in 1933. [^Back]

    [56]. ⑦ The principles of international law put forward by Argentine foreign minister Luis Maria Drago in 1902, opposed large countries to interfere in or occupy the Latin American countries out of dunning for debts. The Second Hague Conference in 1907 adopted the Drago-Porter Convention on the basis of Drago Doctrine. It stipulated that a government cannot dun for debts from another country by force. However, if the debtor refuses to accept the international arbitration or denies the decision made by international arbitration, the creditor can resort to force. [^Back]

    [57]. ⑧ The international principle put forward by Mexico’s foreign minister Estrada that it is natural for countries to acknowledge new governments and they do not have to make a special statement, which means acknowledging the right of self-determination and non-interference in each country. [^Back]

    [58]. ① Zhang, L. Journal of Latin American Studies (拉丁美洲研究), (4): 67 (2014). [^Back]

    [59]. ② Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2015-1-9). [^Back]

    [60]. ③ Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2015-12-1). [^Back]

    [61]. ① Ding, G. Pacific Journal (太平洋学报), (3): 39 (2016). [^Back]

    [62]. ② Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (3) (2015-7-10). [^Back]

    [63]. ① “Brazil’s Economy Plunges 5.4% in the First Quarter Compared to a Year Ago”, June 2, 2016. http: //en.mercopress.com/2016/06/02/brazil-s-economy-plunges-5.4-in-the-first-quarter-compared-to-a-year-ago. [2016-05-25] [^Back]

    [64]. ① Amy Kaslow, “Obama’s Visit to Argentina Exposes a Nation Struggling to Grow”, in The Fortune, March 23, 2016. http: //fortune.com/2016/03/23/Obama-visit-argentina-macri-economy.[2016-05-28] [^Back]

    [65]. ② Earl Anthony Wayne, “A New Beginning with Argentina”, March 22, 2016. https: //www.wilsoncenter.org/article/new-beginning-argentina#sthash.S8oxOhAZ.dpuf. [2016-05-28] [^Back]

    [66]. ③ “Argentina, One of Brazil’s Main Foreign Policy Priorities, Anticipated Serra Who is Expected in Buenos Aires”, May 23, 2016. http: //en.mercopress.com/2016/05/23/. [2016-05-28] [^Back]

    [67]. ④ Vladimir Mikheev, “BRICS: Should Russia be Worried about a Brazilian ‘Brexit’?”, May 27, 2016. http: //rbth.com/opinion/2016/05/27/brics-should-russia-be-worried-about-a-brazilian-brexit_598087. [2016-05-30] [^Back]

    [68]. ① Mark Keller “Comercio de China y América Latina: El Fin de losBuenos Tiempos”, 16 de Junio 2014. http: //www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/esp/article.aspx? id=7159. [2016-05-28] [^Back]

    [69]. ② Jiang, S. Contemporary world (当代世界), (1): 8 (2016). [^Back]

    [70]. ③ “Presidencia de CELAC Destaca Equilibrio de Intereses en Acuerdo con China”, 11 de en erode 2015. http: //www.infolatam.com/2015/01/11/presidencia-de-celac-destaca-equilibrio-de-intereses-en-acuerdo-con-china.[2016-05-28] [^Back]

    [71]. ① Ronn Pineo, “China and Latin America: What You Need to Know”, July 29, 2015. http: //www.coha.org/china-and-latin-america-what-you-need-to-know. [2016-05-30] [^Back]

    [72]. ② Enrique Dussel Peters “China’s Evolving Role in Latin America, Can It Be a Win-Win?”, Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arshtlatin America Center, September 2015. http: //publications.atlanticcouncil.org/chinalatam//AC_CHINA090915DP.pdf.[2016-06-05] [^Back]

    [73]. ③Luis Miguel Gonzáles “Quéquiere Chinade México?”, Abril 3, 2013. http: //eleconomista.com.mx/caja-fuerte/2013/04/02/que-quiere-china-mexic. [2016-06-05] [^Back]

    [74]. ④ Fu, Z. Guangming Daily (光明日报), (2013-6-5). [^Back]

    [75]. ⑤ “Panamanian President-Elect Will Respect Diplomatic ‘Truce’ with Taiwan, China”, in Latin America Herald Tribune, Caracas, June 19, 2014. [^Back]

    [76]. ① OECD/ECLAC/CAF, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Towards a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015, p. 17. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en. [2016-06-08] [^Back]

    [77]. ② “Macri Visit to China in December: The Strategic Relation with Beijing Stands, Says Argentine Ambassador”. http: //en.mercopress.com/2016/03/28. [2016-06-08] [^Back]

    [78]. ③ “Argentina, One of Brazil’s Main Foreign Policy Priorities, Anticipated Serra Who is Expected in Buenos Aires”, May 23, 2016. http: //en.mercopress.com/2016/05/23/argentina-one-of-brazil-s-main-foreign-policy-priorities-anticipated-serra-who-is-expected-in-buenos-aires.[2016-06-09]. [^Back]

    [79]. ① Xi, J. People’s Daily (人民日报), (2) (2014-7-19). [^Back]

    [80]. ② http: //www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1227004.shtml [^Back]

This Article

ISSN:1002-6649

CN: 11-1160/C

Vol 38, No. 04, Pages 1-22+154

August 2016

Downloads:1

Share
Article Outline

Abstract

  • 1 The intrinsic logic of constructing community of shared destiny
  • 2 Building a community of shared destiny for common progress between China and Latin America
  • 3 The challenge of constructing the community of shared destiny between China and Latin America
  • 4 Countermeasures and prospects
  • Footnote