Automated negotiation model with the collaborative offering of team based on cooperative game

GAO Tai-guang1,2,3 WANG Qing1,2 HUANG Min1,2 WANG Xing-wei1,2 ZHANG Yu1,2

(1.College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004)
(2.State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004)
(3.School of Management, Heilongjiang University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150022)

【Abstract】Enterprises operating as an alliance are beneficial to improve the cooperative operation ability of a supply chain. To further give full play to its advantage in negotiating with their demanders by group collaborative offering, according to the characteristics of the vertical alliance with production and logistics enterprises in the supply chain, this paper proposes an automated negotiation model with the collaborative offering of production-logistics vertical alliance based on the cooperative game, in which the theories of the negotiation team and cooperative game are combined with automated negotiation theory. In addition, the alliance collaborative profit derived from the negotiation result is distributed with the Shapley value method according to contribution or importance contributed by each team member. The results show that, in the case of centralized pricing by the production-logistics vertical alliance, each team member may get the best profit meanwhile optimizing the total profit of negotiation team if they calculate offer with a completely cooperative attitude, which may also be good for maintaining the stable cooperation relationship of the production-logistics vertical alliance in the fierce market competition environment.

【Keywords】 production-logistics vertical alliance; negotiation team; automated negotiation; cooperative game; Shapley value;

【DOI】

【Funds】 Project of International Cooperation and Exchanges, National Natural Science Foundation of China (71620107003) Program for Innovative Research Teams in Liaoning Colleges and Universities (LT2016007) Fundamental Research Funds for State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries (2013ZCX11) Fundamental Research Funds for Heilongjiang Provincial Undergraduate Universities (2018-KYYWF-1164) Planning Project of Philosophy and Social Science of Heilongjiang Province (19GLE331, 18JYB155, 14C004)

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This Article

ISSN:1001-0920

CN: 21-1124/TP

Vol 35, No. 02, Pages 285-296

February 2020

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Article Outline

Abstract

  • 0 Introduction
  • 1 Review of related research
  • 2 Framework and process of ANCOT
  • 3 The definition and description of ANCOT
  • 4 The definition of the demander agent Da
  • 5 Numerical simulation and analysis
  • 6 Conclusion
  • References