Labor mobility and rural social security: model and empirical study

LIU Binbin1 LIN Bin2 FENG Bo2 SHI Qinghua1

(1.Antai College Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
(2.School of Economics, Fudan University)

【Abstract】This paper studies the influence of labor mobility on rural public security based on village-level data from NFP during 1995 to 2013. The research results show that labor mobility, especially labor inflow, has a positive and significant influence on rural civil disputes, the violation of security regulations and criminal cases. Compared with inland areas, labor mobility has a greater influence on coastal areas. In addition, the incidence rate of poverty, the education level of labor, the idle labor, and the number of grassroots village cadres also play an important role in rural public security. Thus, strengthening the supervision of labor inflow, improving the construction of rural grassroots organizations, and reducing rural poor groups are especially important for maintaining rural order.

【Keywords】 rural labor mobility; civil dispute; security regulation; criminal offense;


【Funds】 The National Natural Foundation of China (71673186, 71603154, 71473165, 71473163) Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (15ZS022) Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education (14YJC790034) National Fixed Point Office

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(Translated by WANG bo)


    [1]. ① Civil disputes mainly include: marriage and family disputes, inheritance disputes, contract disputes, property disputes, personal disputes and special infringement disputes. [^Back]

    [2]. ② A criminal case refers to the case when a criminal suspect or defendant is accused of infringing the social relationship protected by the criminal law, investigation, adjudication and criminal sanction (such as fines, fixed-term imprisonment, death penalty, deprivation of political right) will be carried out on the purpose of prosecuting the criminal suspect or the defendant for his or her criminal liability. [^Back]

    [3]. ③ Ln (1+MS) is the natural logarithm of (1+MS). The civil dispute occurrence rate of some villages in the samples is 0. To ensure that civil disputes with the value 0 are meaningful after taking the logarithm, a constant must be added before taking the logarithm. To ensure that civil disputes are meaningful when the value is set to 0, when taking the logarithm, a constant is added. Here, to facilitate the analysis, a constant 1 is added. Ln (1 + ZA), ln (1 + XS), and ln (1 + pk) are similar to this. [^Back]

    [4]. ④ The number of the people with religious beliefs in the village refers to the aggregate of the population that believes in Buddhism, Islam, Christianity and other religion in the village [^Back]

    [5]. ⑤ Rural labor refers to the family labor whose registered permanent residences are in the rural areas, or who have no registered permanent rural residences but are employed in rural areas all the year round. Those who work in state-owned enterprises and institutions and who go out to work on their own should also be included because their registered permanent residences have not been transferred. National retired people with the capability to work, although their registered permanent residences are not in the rural areas, they annually participate in rural production. Thus, they should also be included. In-service national workers whose registered permanent residences are not in the rural areas and are not employed in the rural areas are non-rural labor and should not be included. [^Back]

    [6]. ⑥ The resident population at the end of the year refers to the people who often live at home or live at home for more than 6 months at the end of the year and whose economic lives are combined with the households. For contract workers, temporary workers and other workers who work outside, although they work outside for more than 6 months, their incomes are mainly brought home. Thus, they still need to be counted. State employees and retired people who live at home and whose lives are combined with their households also be counted. However, employees who join the army and live outside are not counted. [^Back]

    [7]. ⑦ Average income of the village. This variable is seriously missing in the village-level database. This paper uses the “family annual net income” in the household data of China’s rural fixed observation points to replace the average income of the village-level database. [^Back]

    [8]. ⑧ The number of idle labor is converted with 300 idle days amounting to 1 person. [^Back]

    [9]. ⑨ ⑩ China’s inland areas include the followings: the eastern part includes Beijing Municipality, Tianjin Municipality, Hebei Province, Shandong Province, Jiangsu Province, Shanghai Municipality, Zhejiang Province, Fujian Province, Guangdong Province, and Hainan Province; the central part includes Shanxi Province, Henan Province, Hubei Province, Hunan Province, Anhui Province, and Jiangxi Province; the western includes Chongqing Municipality, Sichuan Province, Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province, Tibet Autonomous Region, Shanxi Province, Gansu Province, Qinghai Province, Ningxia Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Guangxi Autonomous Region; the northeast part includes Heilongjiang Province, Jilin Province, and Liaoning Province. [^Back]


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This Article


CN: 11-1235/F

Vol , No. 09, Pages 73-84

September 2017


Article Outline


  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Data source and variable definition
  • 3 The influence of labor mobility on rural public security
  • 4 Regional comparison of the influence of labor mobility on rural public security
  • 5 Robustness test and endogenous discussion
  • 6 Conclusion and comment
  • Footnote