【摘要】原产地规则是FTA的产品国籍, 是隐性的贸易保护措施。本文基于2002—2015年产品层面数据, 利用PPML估计技术实证分析中国FTA中原产地规则例外安排对农产品进口的影响。研究结果表明:原产地规则例外安排和正常安排对农产品进口均具有显著的抑制作用, 这表明原产地规则发挥了进口保护作用;同时, 原产地规则例外安排对进口的抑制作用是正常安排的两倍左右, 其所引致的执行成本分别为9.72%和5.10%。各种稳健性检验均支持上述结论。上述结论表明, 利用特定原产地规则对敏感产品进行保护同样能达到如同关税一样的保护效果, 而且在贸易谈判中更易获得, 是中国FTA战略应该关注的重点。
【基金资助】 广州大学人才引进科研启动项目“中国FTA中农产品原产地规则的基本特征及对进口的影响研究” (27000503117) ; 国家自然科学基金重点项目“食品安全消费者行为与风险交流策略研究” (71633005) ;
Impact of exceptional arrangement of rules of origin on agri-product imports in China’s FTAs
(2.School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Renmin University of China)
【Abstract】The rules of origin (RoO) are the nationalities of products in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which are invisible protection measures on trade. In this paper, based on the product-level data of 2002–2015, we used Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator to analyze the impact of exceptional arrangement of RoO on agriproduct imports in China’s FTAs, followed by various robustness tests. The results show that both exceptional arrangement and normal arrangement of RoO have significant inhibitory effects on agri-product imports, where the inhibitory effect of exceptional arrangement is two times that of normal arrangement. These results reveal the protection effect of RoO on imports with compliance costs of 9.72% and 5.10% for exceptional arrangement and normal arrangement, respectively. In conclusion, using specific RoO to protect sensitive products could be as useful as tariffs, while RoO is easier to be achieved in trade negotiations. Thus we suggest paying more attention to RoO in China’s FTA strategy.
【Keywords】 market access; exceptional arrangements; rules of origin; Free Trade Agreement (FTA) ; agri-products;
【Funds】 Project of Guangzhou University Talent Introduction Research Startup Fund (27000503117); Major Project of National Natural Science Foundation of China (71633005);
. ① As Grossman and Helpman (1995) stated, if sugar and citrus from the United States did not become an exceptional arrangement for tariff concessions, NAFTA might not exist. [^Back]
. ② For example, the original texts of RoO in China-ASEAN FTA and China-New Zealand FTA are 46 pages and 105 pages respectively. It is more complicated to consider the exclusions and alternative combinations of WO, CTC and RVC in RoO. [^Back]
. ① Baier and Bergstrand (2007) pointed out that controlling country-time and product-time in panel data model can better solve the relationship between time-varying non-observable factors and disturbance terms. However, due to the large observed values from text samples, if the country-time and product (2-digit code) -time are controlled, 3108 more variables (185*14) and (37*14) need to be generated, leading to excessive calculation. To this end, drawing on the practice of Hayakawaet al. (2016), this paper respectively controls the country, product and time fixed effects. [^Back]
. ② The specific RoO for agri-products in China’s FTAs are detailed in the article and authored by Lyu Jianxing et al. (2017). [^Back]
. ① The four FTAs on goods were entered into effect in July 2005, July 2006, July 2007 and October 2008, respectively. By 2015, the medium and long-term trade effects of the four FTAs have gradually emerged, while the other FTAs have not fully realized the medium and long-term trade effects. [^Back]
. ② Specifically it includes: Chapter HS01–24, as well as 2801, 2905, 3301, 3501–3505, 3809, 3823, 3913, 4101–4103, 4301, 5001–5003, 5101–5103, 5201–5203, 5301–5305 and 7101. [^Back]
. ③ Principles for conversion from Specific HS8 digit code to HS6 digit code and for conversion between different HS versions are detailed in the data description from Lyu Jianxing et al. (2017). [^Back]
. ④ Due to the limitation of space, descriptive statistics of variables are not shown here. [^Back]
. ① The formula is exp (roo_except)−1. [^Back]
. ① As Kohpaiboon (2010) pointed out, the FTA utilization rates on Thailand’s exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam in 2008 were 18.3%, 27.4%, 16.7% and 26.1%, respectively. [^Back]
. ① Due to the limitation of space, the matching between the experimental group and the control group and the results of the balance test are not shown, and are available upon request. [^Back]
. ① Based on the convenience of calculation, the relative comparative advantage ratios are the average values between the years of 2002–2004, and are all data derived before the four FTAs’ entry into effect. [^Back]
. ① Similarly based on computational convenience, import proportions are the average values between the years of 2002–2004, and are all data derived before the four FTAs’ entry into effect. [^Back]
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