中国FTA中原产地规则例外安排对农产品进口的影响

吕建兴1 曾寅初2

(1.广州大学经济与统计学院)
(2.中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院)
【知识点链接】遵循成本; 调仓

【摘要】原产地规则是FTA的产品国籍, 是隐性的贸易保护措施。本文基于2002—2015年产品层面数据, 利用PPML估计技术实证分析中国FTA中原产地规则例外安排对农产品进口的影响。研究结果表明:原产地规则例外安排和正常安排对农产品进口均具有显著的抑制作用, 这表明原产地规则发挥了进口保护作用;同时, 原产地规则例外安排对进口的抑制作用是正常安排的两倍左右, 其所引致的执行成本分别为9.72%和5.10%。各种稳健性检验均支持上述结论。上述结论表明, 利用特定原产地规则对敏感产品进行保护同样能达到如同关税一样的保护效果, 而且在贸易谈判中更易获得, 是中国FTA战略应该关注的重点。

【关键词】 市场准入; 例外安排; 原产地规则; FTA; 农产品;

【DOI】

【基金资助】 广州大学人才引进科研启动项目“中国FTA中农产品原产地规则的基本特征及对进口的影响研究” (27000503117) 国家自然科学基金重点项目“食品安全消费者行为与风险交流策略研究” (71633005)

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    脚注

    [1]. (1) 正如Grossman和Helpman (1995) 所述的, 若美国的糖和柑橘没有成为关税减让的例外安排, 北美自由贸易区可能不存在。 [^Back]

    [2]. (2) 如中国-东盟FTA和中国-新西兰FTA的原产地规则原始文本分别达46页和105页。若考虑原产地规则的境内原产、税则变化和区域价值成分的各种排除、同时拥有可选择的组合, 则更加复杂。 [^Back]

    [3]. (1) Baier和Bergstrand (2007) 指出, 面板数据模型中控制国家-时间和产品-时间能较好解决时变不可观测因素与扰动项的关系。但由于本文样本观测值较大, 若控制国家-时间和产品 (2位码) -时间, 则需再产生 (185*14) 和 (37*14) 3108个变量, 导致计算量过大。为此, 借鉴Hayakawaet al. (2016) 的做法, 本文分别控制国家、产品和时间的固定效应。 [^Back]

    [4]. (2) 中国FTA中农产品具体原产地规则设置详见吕建兴等 (2017) 的文章。 [^Back]

    [5]. (1) 这4个FTA货物贸易协定生效时间分别为2005年7月、2006年7月、2007年7月和2008年10月, 到2015年这4个FTA中长期贸易效应已经逐渐显现, 而其他FTA中长期贸易效应还未完全体现。 [^Back]

    [6]. (2) 具体包括:HS01-24章, 以及2801、2905、3301、3501-3505、3809、3823、3913、4101-4103、4301、5001-5003、5101-5103、5201-5203、5301-5305和7101。 [^Back]

    [7]. (3) 具体HS8位码转为HS6位码以及不同HS版本之间的转换原则详见吕建兴等 (2017) 的数据说明。 [^Back]

    [8]. (4) 限于篇幅限制, 变量的描述性统计没有在此展示。 [^Back]

    [9]. (1) 计算公式为exp (roo_except) -1。 [^Back]

    [10]. (1) 如Kohpaiboon (2010) 的研究指出, 2008年泰国出口印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾和越南的FTA利用率分别为18.3%、27.4%、16.7%和26.1%。 [^Back]

    [11]. (1) 限于篇幅限制, 试验组和控制组的匹配情况以及平衡性检验的结果未展示, 需要可索取。 [^Back]

    [12]. (1) 基于计算的便利性, 相对比较优势比为2002-2004年的平均值, 均为4个FTA生效前的数据。 [^Back]

    [13]. (1) 同样基于计算的便利性, 进口占比为2002-2004年的平均值, 均为4个FTA生效前的数据。 [^Back]

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This Article

ISSN:1002-4670

CN: 11-1692/F

Vol , No. 11, Pages 132-144

November 2018

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Article Outline

知识点

摘要

  • 引言
  • 一、计量模型、估计方法与数据来源
  • 二、估计结果与讨论
  • 三、结论与政策启示
  • 脚注

    参考文献