Research on interactive effects of family ownership and non-controlling state ownership on corporate performance: complementary or substitutive
【Abstract】In the context that the development of mixed-ownership enterprises controlled by non-public capital in China is being encouraged, the paper discusses the interactive effects of family ownership and non-controlling state ownership on corporate performance based on the sample of Chinese private listed corporations. The results of the study show that family ownership and non-controlling state ownership have complementary effects on corporate performance. The complementary effects have certain differences in different situations. The sample which is originated from the state-owned enterprises demonstrates that family ownership and non-controlling state ownership have a significant complementary effect; as for the sample which is originated from private enterprises, the complementary effect is insignificant. In regions with a good institutional environment, family ownership and non-controlling state ownership have a significant complementary effect. In regions with a poor institutional environment, the complementary effect is not significant. A further analysis reveals that the strength of family involvement will affect the effect of introducing non-controlling state ownership to family corporations. When the strength is relatively low, the introduction of non-controlling state ownership can improve family corporations’ performance; while when the former is relatively high, the introduction of non-controlling state ownership will reduce family corporations’ performance. A dynamic study shows that when the family ownership ratio increases and the non-controlling state ownership ratio decreases, corporate performance will be improved.
【Keywords】 family ownership; non-controlling state ownership; enterprise performance; complementary effect; substitution effect;
(Translated by ZHANG yan)
. ① Due to limited space, the empirical results of robustness tests are not reported here. If necessary, please contact the author. [^Back]
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