Strategic uncertainty in the background of adjustment of US Grand Strategy: Trump’s DPRK policy and evolution of Peninsular security

GE Hanwen1

(1.School of International Relations, National University of Defense Technology, Nanjing 210039)

【Abstract】Since taking over the presidency, Donald Trump has replaced Mr. Obama’s DPRK Policy of “strategic patience” with “maximum pressure and engagement.” In the last two years, Trump Government has applied policies including military threats, economic sanctions, diplomatic persuasion and verbal aggression, which highly influenced the development of security situation of Korean Peninsula. Trump’s adjustment of DPRK policy, including the threat of war or the historical meeting with DPRK leader, originates from a simplified consideration by utilizing “strategic uncertainty.” Trump’s policy could be viewed as a part of the US Grand Strategy of dealing with competition of great powers, especially China. Trump’s policy could not decisively change the status quo of Korean Peninsula or even resolve the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Peninsula’s security situation will go back to multilateral diplomatic wrangling. China should deeply analyze the logic and core of US policy to China, DPRK and the Peninsula and after that reset the priority of China’s strategic aims in related issues in order to stabilize the Peninsula security.

【Keywords】 the US; DPRK; the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula; strategic uncertainty; security;

【DOI】

【Funds】 National Social Science Fund of China (18ZDA130) Chinese Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2016M603020)

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(Translated by LI Mengling)

    Footnote

    [1]. ① They are Resolution 2356 adopted on June 2, Resolution 2371 adopted on August 5, Resolution 2375 adopted on September 11 and Resolution 2397 adopted on December 22 respectively. [^Back]

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This Article

ISSN:1003-7411

CN: 22-1180/C

Vol 28, No. 01, Pages 116-126+128

January 2019

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Article Outline

Knowledge

Abstract

  • 1 Evolution of US policy towards DPRK and Trump’s strategic adjustment after the Cold War
  • 2 Logic and essence of Trump’s policy towards DPRK
  • 3 Impact of the US in the evolution of Peninsular security
  • 4 Conclusion
  • Footnote

    References