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Brief

Management World is supervised by Development Research Center of The State Council, and sponsored by Development Research Center of The State Council. It aims to reflect the multi-field and multi-disciplinary research on China’s economic and social management issues, and to provide services for China’s economic reform and development. Its scope covers fiscal and financial research, rural economics, macroeconomic management, public management, business management, industrial and regional development. The journal, included in CSSCI and JST, has been in the top list in the field of economic management for many years, and achieved a very high reputation from readers all over the world.
Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief
Li Kemu

Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Tian Yuan,He Shaohua, Lu Jian, Jiang Dongsheng

Editorial Board
Ma Xiaogang, Qiao Renyi, Li Jiping, Li Menggang, Li Peiyu, Zhang Xinmmin, Shen Bainian, Chen Dongsheng, Cheng Quansheng, Zhao Jie,Tuo Zhen

The university essence and its contractual arrangements: a paradigm of modern enterprise theory

ZHENG Wenquan

Management World,2017,No. 10

This paper mainly outlines the ways by which people receive higher education under market conditions into three types, including self-sufficiency, direct transactions between teachers and students, and university education; besides, it questions closely that “why do they need to go to universities since direct transactions between teachers and students could solve the problem of higher education.” Then, the modern enterprise theory has been introduced into the university essence and by analyzing the contract arrangements among university, students, teachers, headmasters and administrative staffs, as well as the changes under the nonprofit system, this paper has gained following understandings. Firstly, as a central contractor, a university, in essence, is a kind of contractual organization that can save transaction costs under pure market conditions. Secondly, what a university signs with students is a kind of incomplete market contract about knowledge transactions, which requires the university to have residual control right over the students. Thirdly, the contract signed by a university and a teacher, who is the owner of human capital, is a kind of factor market contract; the tenure system is an institutional arrangement in which teachers share the residual earnings of the university indirectly, and the post-tenure review is a dynamic adjustment against the contract terms by the university and teachers under the new situation. Fourthly, the purpose of internalizing university headmasters and administrative staffs through factor market contracts is to reduce internal management costs. Because their human capital and job nature are different from the teachers,’ the overcoming of their opportunistic behaviors under nonprofit conditions can be achieved mainly through the system combination of non-residual incentives. Fifthly, while saving transaction costs, the internal management costs of the university also increase. When the two are marginally equal, the scale of the university is fixed. Thus, the university’s substitution for direct transactions between teachers and students is not unlimited but is comprehensively influenced by factors such as knowledge characteristics, transaction costs and scale constraints. Besides, other forms of organizational education can coexist with the university. The research in this paper not only breaks through the nonprofit organizations with the public education system as a priori basis and the university as the established existence, but also studies the university externally and pays special attention to the research tradition of university functions and concepts. Besides, this paper further goes deep into the behavioral interactions of different subjects within the university to study the economic reasons for the university origin and the various contract arrangements within universities. Then, it proves that the “problem of university essence” under market conditions is the logical starting point for understanding the institutional arrangements of universities under other systems. The knowledge gained is of significant implications for clarifying some vague understandings in China’s higher education, looking for the behavioral logic that should be followed by China’s university system reform, and designing specific contract arrangements within universities. The research in this paper also provides a new sample for cross-organizational research on profit and nonprofit organizations at the same time.

Roles of foreign subsidiaries and the matching effects with their control modes: a dual cross-case qualitative comparative analysis

HAO Jin;WANG Fengbin;WANG Cong

Management World,2017,No. 10

How to establish tie portfolios to improve performance for entrepreneurial firms？

HAN Wei;YANG Jun;CHEN Fengwen;ZHANG Yuli;DENG Yu

Management World,2017,No. 10

Research on macro-prudential policy rules and the transmission path

LI Tianyu ;ZHANG Qishan ;ZHANG He

Management World,2017,No. 10

Since the US subprime mortgage crisis, the traditional way of financial regulation is unsustainable and countries around the world are reforming financial regulation. In this background, macro-prudential policy has become the focus of attention of scholars and policymakers all around the world. This paper is based on the BGG-NK-DSGE model which incorporates rational expectation contracts. We build up a fundamental model for the macro-prudential policy research as we construct a measurement index for the banking systemic risk by making the bank bankruptcy mechanism endogenous. The systemic risk factor is incorporated into the welfare loss function to regulate rules concerning macro-prudential policies; then, we stimulate path of policy transmission mechanism and resolve the policy mix problems through impulse-response function accordingly. The following conclusions are obtained: Firstly, Macro-prudential supervision system with the core of dynamic capital adequacy ratio and loan to value ratio should emphasize the output gap and credit market liquidity. Secondly, both the macro-prudent monetary policy and macro-prudential supervision policy have the role of maintaining financial stability, but as a regular policy, macro-prudential supervision is superior to the macro-prudent monetary policy. Thirdly, identifying driving factors of economic cycle fluctuations is the key to establishing macro-prudential policy rules and rendering the effectiveness of policy transmitting into real economy to play its role of risk prevention and control. Lastly, it enhances the positive spillover effect of policy and overcomes various drawbacks if we can establish reasonable coefficients of policy rules when we combine these two types of macro-prudential policies; nevertheless, it is difficult to handle the coordination of policies. Since the macro-prudential supervision policy is superior to the conventional macro-prudent monetary policy, we should only use the macro-prudential supervision policy in regular periods in order to prevent the interference in the effect caused by policy mismatch and use two policies together for the sake of financial stability in the high-risk periods.