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Brief

China Industrial Economics is supervised by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and sponsored by Institute of Industrial Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It aims to report researches on industrial economics and business management, and to reflect outstanding research results on Chinese industrial economy and enterprise development. The scope covers national economy, industrial economy and business management. The journal is included in CSSCI, and is the top journal in the field of industrial economics in China.
Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief
Huang Qunhui

Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Shi Dan, Li Haijian

Does excess goodwill become the burden of corporate operation: explanation from the perspective of product market competitiveness

WEI Zhihua;ZHU Caiyun

China Industrial Economics,2019,No. 11

Can managerial ability protect the interests of minority shareholders in subsidiaries—a perspective of parent-subsidiary’s two-way governance

XU Ning;ZHANG Yang;XU Xiangyi

China Industrial Economics,2019,No. 11

Protecting the interests of minority shareholders is one of the most prominent corporate governance issues under the Chinese context. Can the competent subsidiary managers counteract headquarters’ expropriation instead of relying on the external governance mechanism? Based on parent-subsidiary’s two-way governance perspective and core points of the theory of reference-dependent preferences, this paper interpreted how the subsidiary managerial ability works on the parent company’s expropriation, and empirically examined the inhibiting effect and the influence mechanism of subsidiary managerial ability on the parent company’s expropriation by using data of listed subsidiaries in China from 2008 to 2017. The study showed that the subsidiary managerial ability had a significant inhibiting effect on the parent company’s expropriation. The subsidiary managerial ability could inhibit such expropriation by way of enhancing value creation, improving internal control quality, and reducing financing constraints of subsidiaries. In expanded research, this paper compared the inhibiting effects of managerial ability under different situational factors by grouping CEO characteristic dimensions in terms of the level of CEO’s share, power structure and career background. The results showed that in samples with a high level of CEO’s share, separation of chairman and CEO, and CEO with complex career background, the managerial ability had a significant inhibiting effect on the parent company’s expropriation; while in samples with a low level of CEO’s share, CEO duality, and CEO with single career background, the counteracting effect of managerial ability is not significant, which further reveals the boundary of subsidiary managerial ability affecting the type II agency problem. This paper enriches and expands managerial ability research in the corporate governance field under the Chinese context, and provides new theoretical support and empirical evidence for the construction of subsidiary minority shareholders’ interests protection mechanism.

Medium term expenditure framework and getting out of procyclicality trap: analysis based on data from 88 countries

SUN Lin;WANG Shudai

China Industrial Economics,2019,No. 11

A study on the development path of China’s strategic emerging industries: big market inducement

HUANG Xianhai;ZHANG Shengli

China Industrial Economics,2019,No. 11

Digital trade negotiation and rule competition: a study based on text quantification of regional trade agreements

HAN Jian;CAI Jiwei;XU Yayun

China Industrial Economics,2019,No. 11