China Industrial Economics is supervised by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and sponsored by Institute of Industrial Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It aims to report researches on industrial economics and business management, and to reflect outstanding research results on Chinese industrial economy and enterprise development. The scope covers national economy, industrial economy and business management. The journal is included in CSSCI, and is the top journal in the field of industrial economics in China.
By using the method of experimental economics, this paper explores the risk of market volatility of carbon permit and its stability mechanism in the forthcoming of China’s national carbon market. In this paper, the stability policies of the current carbon markets such as the EU, North America and Guangdong are summarized to price stability, price-quantity stability and quantity stability mechanisms, and theoretical modeling and economics experiments are conducted. This paper finds that the macroeconomic cycle and the irrational carbon permit trades of enterprises have contributed to the volatility of the carbon market. In the face of huge volatility of carbon price, price-quantity stability and price stability mechanisms can better maintain the market’s trading rationality: the higher the production efficiency of enterprises is the greater the total social welfare is. The market performance of both quantity and non-stability mechanisms is unsatisfactory. In the case of oversupply of carbon permits, the market performance of the price-quantity stability mechanism is particularly prominent, which has obvious advantages over other stability mechanisms in terms of price stability, production stability and social efficiency. The impact of various types of market stability mechanisms on enterprises also varies. Low-emission enterprises have the largest advantage over high-emission enterprises in the carbon market with price-quantity stability mechanism, and have fewer advantages in the carbon markets of other stability mechanisms.
Factor quality is the basic factor that determines the division status under global value chain (GVC), and factor combination has an important influence on the play of this function. In view of this, this paper describes the realization mechanism of talent dividend from the perspective of factor quality matching, and uses the Chinese empirical data to test the hypothesis. Theoretical analysis shows that, because of the influence of the factors of production quality on GVC upgrading, it not only depends on the quality of the single factor itself, but also depends on quality matching with other factors. The higher the degree of quality matching is, the more conducive it is to promoting GVC upgrading. Thus, better matching with the technology and system helps to play the role of the talents in realizing talent dividend. The empirical results show that, in terms of China’s manufacturing industry, purely talented factors’ function on GVC upgrading shows the trend of inverted U-shape, and this trend becomes significantly and positively linear after taking full account of matching effect such as talent-technology match and talent-institution match. These findings mean that the key to the full play of the talent on China’s GVC upgrading depends on matching quality of talent-technology and talent-institution. Therefore, except for cultivating human capital, to improve the quality of institution system and speed up industrial technological progress so as to enhance the matching quality of talent-technology and talent-institution is an effective way to realize talent dividends and also has strong strategic implications for structural reform.
In the fundamental economic theories, quality refers to the use value of products that meet specific needs. As China embarks upon a New Era of high-quality development, it is increasingly important and imperative for China’s economic development to live up to its real nature, which is to satisfy people’s growing needs for a better life. In nature, economic development is motivated by the pursuit to achieve development with higher quality under given economic conditions. The multidimensionality and richness of development quality require a high degree of innovation in the choice of development strategies and models. Systematically creating development advantages, pursuing a path consistent with the reality and reflecting national characteristics, and satisfying people’s growing needs in an effective and sustainable manner are the essential characteristics of high-quality development. Various places should pursue high-quality development manifested in various forms based on their local conditions. In the final analysis, the development quality is measured by whether economic development is able to satisfy people’s growing needs for a better life. A better life is never measured by people’s material needs alone, but is increasingly manifested in people’s needs for all-round development. Unlike the rapid growth stage where instrumental rationality is the dominant momentum, the high-quality development stage requires the new momentum of value-based rationality, which is manifested in the development strategies and objectives that more directly reflect what people want and what economic development is truly intended to achieve. On the supply side，this new momentum is driven by innovation; on the demand side, it is driven by people’s desires. This new momentum requires a perfect match between the instrumental rationality of market economy and the value-based rationality of economic development.
Based on innovative enterprise theory and labor theory of value, this paper proposes the theoretical framework of combining social environment with heterogeneity labor. The paper emphasizes that the innovative enterprises depend on cognitive labor to implement supply-side structural reform under the new social environment. The main conclusions are three aspects: ① The new social environment integrates advanced demand structure with symmetric information structure, so the key structural issue of supply side is changing from the competition among producers to the competition between producers and consumers. ② In response to the changes of the social environment, Xiaomi presents a three-stage structural reform which is the formation-distribution-replication of cognitive labor. Firstly, by means of mobile Internet, the demand direction, object, content and quantity could be cognized in advance, so as to promote the structural reform which could make consumer demand from exogenous to endogenous. Secondly, it uses cognitive labor to allocate R&D labor, transactional labor and productive labor which promote the reform of single product enterprise from production-driven structure to market-driven structure. Finally, in terms of the replication of cognitive labor, Xiaomi speeds up from a productive enterprise to a platform enterprise through the product spillover, network externalities, inter-group income structure adjustment. ③ Xiaomi has explored cognitive labor-biased Chinese path. It has parallelly transformed supply-side structure condition, which made the high global value chain captured mode gradually transforme into a powerful byproduct of consumers. It provides an amazing Chinese sample and some Chinese experience for micro-implementation of supply-side structural reform.
It is necessary for business organizations and business practices to prove their legitimacy, and the standards for evaluating the legitimacy is the institutional logics elaborated by rhetoric. Thus, rhetorical strategies have become the main methods for business organizations to carry out the legitimacy management. The impact of the rhetorical strategies on the legitimacy management can be realized through two mechanisms. One is cognition or sensemaking and the other is persuasion or sensegiving. The institutional environments are an important moderator when the rhetorical strategies are used for the legitimacy management, and the institutional logics, the core of the institution, acts as a moderator between the rhetorical strategies and the legitimacy. According to the stability or instability of the institutional condition and the institutional content coming from the internal institutional logics or the universal institutional logics, the institutional environments in which the enterprises implement the legitimacy management can be partitioned into four types. The type-matrix provides a frame for business organizations to construe the attributes of the issues they were faced with and what rhetorical strategies they could implement. Under a stable circumstance, for the legitimacy management, the actors can employ obedient strategies that follow the dominant institutional logics, elusive strategies that evade the dominant institutional logics, or some rhetorical strategies integrating the former two. Under an unstable circumstance, the actors can employ critical strategies that criticize the dominant institutional logics, framing strategies that establish new dominant institutional logics, or some decoupled strategies which are substantially framing but symbolically obedient. Rhetorical practices of Chinese corporations have provided plentiful materials for empirical research and the investigators should pay more attention to the perlocutionary research of rhetorical strategies for legitimacy management.
The rapid expansion of the local government debt scale in China has led to a rapid rise in the financial and economic leverage, and the potential systemic financial risk caused by debt risk has become the focus of the Chinese government. This paper simulates the accumulative superposition mechanism of debt-financial risk and the possibility of triggering the systemic financial risk by constructing a DSGE model with local government debt, which influences bank liquidity constraints and private credit investment. The research shows that the local government’s investment impulse drives the local debt pro-cyclical pattern; the large subscriptions of commercial banks to local government debt make the debt risk change into financial risk; and commercial banks are the carriers of the risk of local government debt expansion. In the case of the declining of implicit guarantee rate of the central government, the cumulative nature of financial risks distorts the efficiency of credit rating, meanwhile brings residents and financial sector who hold local government debts much more risk, at last, triggering systemic financial risks when the critical value is reached. The central government should not deal with systemic financial risks with an approach of “one size fits all” but lower the risk by reducing the implicit guarantee rate step by step, and the appropriate guarantee rate interval is [0.71, 0.99] under our simulation. Meanwhile, the best time for the central government to cut the leverage is when annual debt growth to GDP ratio reaches 2.88%, and the implicit central government guarantee rate reaches 79%.
The design of executive equity incentive is an important problem to influence the consequence of executive equity incentive. However, extant literature pays less attention on the impact of design of equity incentive contracts on firms’ internal control. In the real world, all the A-share listed companies in China must set some performance hurdles in their executive equity incentive contracts since 2008. Based on the institutional setting, this paper is aimed to examine the influence of mandatory setting and disclosure of performance hurdles in the executive equity incentive on the internal control effectiveness of those listed companies. Specifically, this paper focuses on the listed companies that have implemented equity incentives since 2008 with the divergent theoretical lens related to equity incentive. The results of empirical examination show that the higher level of performance hurdles of the companies, compared with their historical benchmark or their peer average level, produces the more effective internal control after the adoption of performance vesting equity incentives. Moreover, the performance hurdles set by equity incentive contracts ultimately promote performance goals by virtue of the path of improving the effectiveness of internal controls. Thus, the conclusion actually responds to the theoretical tensions about whether executives’ equity incentive is to alleviate the agency problem or generate new agency problems, and supports the optimal contracting theory at last. In terms of the practical implications, this paper helps to reveal the economic outcome and its contigency of mandatory performance hurdles in executive equity incentive of listed companies in China.
