China Industrial Economics is supervised by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and sponsored by Institute of Industrial Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It aims to report researches on industrial economics and business management, and to reflect outstanding research results on Chinese industrial economy and enterprise development. The scope covers national economy, industrial economy and business management. The journal is included in CSSCI, and is the top journal in the field of industrial economics in China.
Shareholder heterogeneity indicates that different shareholders have different pursuits in corporate governance and then request different rates of return. In China, the difference between state shareholders and non-state shareholders and the cost of equity capital difference caused by it are the financial basis of the implementation of the mixed ownership reform. The financial advantage of mixed ownership is to realize the minimum cost of capital through the interest game between different shareholders. Data in this paper show that the state shareholder is still the largest controlling shareholder in Chinese companies, playing a decisive role on Chinese corporate governance quality. Shareholder heterogeneity has a significant influence on the corporate cost of capital, but the cost of state-owned capital is lower than the cost of non-state-owned capital because of a mixture of the functions of the government and the state-owned capital investment requirements and the inertia of the government economic management. The cost of capital of state shareholder’s investment is also affected by the nature of the industry invested. Under the control of the state holding, the participation of non-state shareholder with higher requested rate of return will certainly bring capital structure with higher cost of capital, and then bring the “paradox of capital cost” which is irreconcilable with the target of the reform. This phenomenon will be gradually eliminated, accompanied by the clarity of state shareholder’s function, the promotion of state-owned capital investment rationality, as well as the perfection of Chinese enterprises’ corporate governance, and this is the process which Chinese mixed ownership reform tends to be successful.
It is urgent to find the optimal donation strategy for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) who are in such a dilemma that however much they donate, more or less, they are prone to condemn. The paper identifies the donation difference due to SOEs’ property difference from private enterprises (PEs) (SOE donation difference) [FYM1] based on the assumption that SOEs’ donation is evaluated in relation to PEs’ which is taken as a reference, and studies its effect on performance; this paper further analyzes and tests the assumption that SOEs donate by referring to PEs’ donation. The paper finds that an inverted-U relationship exists between enterprise performance and SOE donation difference, and that SOE donation difference is more than zero when enterprise performance reaches the maximal value. It indicates that although SOEs should donate more than PEs, there is an optimal value when PEs’ donation is used as a reference and enterprise performance is used as the evaluation standard in order to find the optimal strategy in SOEs’ donation dilemma. Further empirical examination reveals that the inverted-U relationship is more obvious for highly monopolistic SOEs and that their optimal donation value is larger. Furthermore, additional empirical test indicates that SOEs may reduce the aforementioned donation requirements by strengthening communication of social responsibility and improving the social responsibility performance except for donation. The paper describes the unique innate feature of SOEs’ donation during the transition period, throws light on how to make a suitable donation plan, and provides new theory and empirical evidence for in-depth understanding of the native characteristics of the corporate donation.
A large number of Chinese manufacturing plants with labor-intensive features, in future competition, it is very urgent to improve workers. Job performance, of which is generally considered to improve production technology innovation, organizational management and production conditions. From the new perspective of family life outside of production work' the article studies how the family time impacted workers' job performance. Firstly, the establishment of an optimization model based on household production function proved when worker household time on household production's marginal returns increased, it can facilitate improvement of the work performance. While marginal returns of leisure time and sleep time is decremented, it can also contribute to improvement of the work performance. Based on a typical factory assembly line workers in the field follow-up study, the paper confirmed the predictive theoretical model. Theory and demonstration of this paper shows that an active lifestyle can effectively improve work efficiency, the idea that by improving the quality of life to improve the efficiency has important implications for China's younger generation industrial workers.
A unified carbon emission rights trading market is expected to be established in 2016, but the economic impact of the market linkage is uncertain. Thus, it is critical to quantify the welfare arising from carbon market linkage. This paper constructs total abatement functions by provincial panel data from 2001 to 2012, and examines the change of costs and benefits of three trading representatives from high carbon zones, medium carbon zones and low carbon zones respectively, using marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves. We find that the regional heterogeneity measured by the carbon intensity can lead to differences in MAC curves, which is showed by the increasing type of MAC curves in low carbon zones, and the inverted-U shaped MAC curves in medium and high carbon zones. And then the findings exhibit that the supply curve of tradable carbon rights is horizontal because of the inverted-U shaped MAC curve in the medium carbon zone. In addition, the market clearing price, indicated by the intersection of the supply curve and the demand curve, is about CNY 217.22/tCO2e. Furthermore, we find that the unified carbon trading market can substantially cut counterparties’ abatement cost to make carbon intensity decrease by 40%–45% in 2020 on average by 3.94%. The main implication is that it is essential to let the market solve the problem of greenhouse gas emissions, stress emission capitalization, pay attention to equity based on the development stage of different regions, and gradually achieve regional integration by expanding trade scales.
In the process of urbanization, an appropriate compensation for the dynamic rent surplus is not only the fair consideration to get the land development rights, but also the efficiency cause for the government to balance between population and land urbanization. Based on the theories of dynamic rent spatial separation and bid-rent and on the model of non-renewable resources exploitation during the process of land demolition, we find that: firstly, land rent growth has a spatial difference and the growth rate of the marginal location rent is much higher than that of the mature site; secondly, the demolition is mainly controlled by the demand pull and the ratio of cost and benefit of compensation mechanism; thirdly, the sole static money compensation can easily lead to the demolition championship contest for the land urbanization growth rate faster than that of the population urbanization, and in the long run the welfare loss for the households mainly comes from the lacking of dynamic compensation mechanism. Therefore, to reduce the land hoarding rate, improve the matching degree and efficiency among population, industry and land, set an asset securitization capital pool, reinforce the information disclosure, and reasonably divide the surplus of dynamic land rent are all the rational returns to the harmonious society in the process of urbanization.
During the “12th Five-Year Plan” period, China’s industry maintained a steady and rapid development trend, and the main quantitative indexes of industrial development have been realized, but the fundamental issue that restricts China’s industrial sustainable development for a long time needs to be eliminated. During the “13th Five-Year Plan” period, China’s industrial development will face new opportunities and challenges and industries’ core functions in the national economy and their development mode will experience profound changes under the driving forces of continuous worldwide expansion of the third industrial revolution, the accelerated re-construction of global trade & investment, further deepening of China’s comprehensive reform, as well as the constant progress of the “Belt and Road” initiative and “Made in China 2025” strategy. Industries’ core functions will gradually switch from previous promotion of economic growth and employment improvement to enhancement of sustainable growth of the national economy, improvement of people’s livelihood and rise of global competitiveness, by promoting technology innovation and transmission. In the “13th Five-Year Plan” period or the future, the guiding ideology for industrial development will become ability enhancement-oriented on the basis of technological complexity and get rid of structural optimization orientation. The leading mode of industrial development will gradually transit from extensive large-scale standard production and imitation for innovation to fine production and independent innovation. In line with the new guiding ideology, industrial development strategy should eventually aim to improve the quality of traditional industries, actively implement “Made in China 2025” strategy, develop emerging strategic industry, promote industrialization and informationization, enhance the integration of IT industry and service industry, urge industrial reform for green low-carbon manner, and establish modern industry system featured in reasonable composition, latest technologies, environment-friendliness, high added-value and high employment rate. Accordingly, in the “13th Five-Year Plan” period, it is strongly proposed making timely adjustment of China’s industrial development policy, including significant enhancement of efficiency of selective supporting policies, improvement of inclusive business environment and construction of the public service system.
This paper carries on an empirical study on wage differentials and the fluctuations between blue-collar and white-collar labor force in and between the state-owned and the non-state-owned sectors – the two have different marketization degree in terms of wage determination – using the recent ten years’ micro-data of China Health and Nutrition Survey. For white-collar workers in China, above 70% of wage advantages come from the advantages of human capital and 30% from return rate discrimination. There is an obvious occupational segmentation in the labor market, and the contributions of the above two factors to wage differentials are not uniform across the wage distribution intervals. In the non-state-owned sector, wage differentials mainly depend on the differences of human capital and compensating wages. However, wage differentials in the state-owned sector are influenced more by institutional factors; additionally, its wage structure is concentrative; an obvious institutional premium for the white collar workers’ wages exists at the low end of the wage distribution, while at the high end the wages are restrained continually compared to that determined by the market due to the interference of a series of regulatory policies. Hence, enforcing the regulation of occupational segmentation and the promotion of professional equality and intensifying the reward mechanism of human capital in the state-owned sector are necessary so as to achieve better fairness and efficiency in China’s labor market.
Usually referring to Western corporate governance research, Chinese scholars neglected such unique characteristics of Chinese capital market as that the existence of controlling shareholders may result in a lack of autonomy for listed companies to disclose information. Although some previous research noted that parent company would like to impose control on the subsidiary, the autonomy of subsidiary and the interaction between parent and subsidiary were ignored, which led the previous research to focus on parent company’s “one-way” governance. This paper introduced parent-subsidiary’s “two-way” governance perspective, so as to perfect current parent-subsidiary governance study, and analyzed the deficiency of parent company’s “one-way” governance. Based on parent-subsidiary’s “two-way” governance perspective, we find difference in parent company’s control over subsidiary’s information disclosure and the existence of a bargaining process between parent and subsidiary. Additionally, compared to Type I Agency Cost, Type II Agency Cost is more serious in Chinese listed companies. This paper offered related suggestions involving legislation, parent company’s controlling behaviors and subsidiary’s governance, to alleviate the influence of Type II Agency Cost on subsidiary’s information disclosure.
