Northeast Asia Forum is supervised by Ministry of Education of PRC, and sponsored by Jilin University. It is an authoritative academic journal, aiming to promote international cooperation, economic and trade, friendly exchanges, especially emphasizing on the strategic issues among Northeast Asian countries. Its scope covers studies in political, economic, historical, cultural, regional cooperation and international relations of Northeast Asia, and also lays stress on the development and new trends in all industries in Northeast Asian and Asia-Pacific areas.
The journal is included in CSSCI.
Editor-in-Chief Zhu Xianping
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Li Yingwu
Editorial Board Lowell Dittmer (U.S.); Lee Il-houng (ROK); Mikhail Titarenko (RUS); Davydov Andrey (RUS); Ogawa Yuhei(JAP); Wang Jisi; Zhu Xianping; Liu Jiangyong; Liu Debin; Li Junjiang; Li
Since taking over the presidency, Donald Trump has replaced Mr. Obama’s DPRK Policy of “strategic patience” with “maximum pressure and engagement.” In the last two years, Trump Government has applied policies including military threats, economic sanctions, diplomatic persuasion and verbal aggression, which highly influenced the development of security situation of Korean Peninsula. Trump’s adjustment of DPRK policy, including the threat of war or the historical meeting with DPRK leader, originates from a simplified consideration by utilizing “strategic uncertainty.” Trump’s policy could be viewed as a part of the US Grand Strategy of dealing with competition of great powers, especially China. Trump’s policy could not decisively change the status quo of Korean Peninsula or even resolve the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Peninsula’s security situation will go back to multilateral diplomatic wrangling. China should deeply analyze the logic and core of US policy to China, DPRK and the Peninsula and after that reset the priority of China’s strategic aims in related issues in order to stabilize the Peninsula security.
Since the 1980s, geopolitics in China’s diplomatic discourse system has experienced three stages: first, the period of gradual acceptance and single meaning, second, the period of extensive use and coexistence of two meanings; third, the period of frequent adjustment and strong rejection. In these three stages, geopolitics has never been the high-frequency word and the mainstream strategic concept in China’s diplomatic discourse system. Since 2015, geopolitics has been strongly rejected by China’s diplomatic discourse system. Four factors contribute to this phenomenon: firstly, the concept of geopolitics is ambiguous and carries heavy historical burdens; secondly, geopolitics does not accord with the condition for diplomatic discourse to become the diplomatic discourse power; thirdly, recently, some countries are suspicious of China’s foreign policies and behaviors, so rejecting geopolitics in diplomatic discourse can increase credibility and relieve doubts; finally, the geopolitical utility has been weakened by the new factors and conditions, and it is doubtful whether logic and thinking of classical geopolitics can adapt to the present and future. However, the article holds that geopolitics isn’t outdated. It just gets broader and more complex, and logic and thinking of classical geopolitics still have a great influence on the decision-makers. In light of this, while rejecting geopolitics and hold high the banner of “global governance” in the diplomatic discourse system, China should, on the one hand, fully recognize the neighboring powers’ special concern for geopolitics, and on the other hand adhere to and improve its geopolitical identity of the great sea power so as to take the lead in the combination of geopolitics and global governance.
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core has creatively put forward a series of new ideas, new thoughts, and new strategies on diplomacy. Gradually Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy has been formed and established. It provides theoretical guidelines for China’s diplomacy in the new era, and contributes Chinese perspectives and wisdoms for promoting reforms within the global governance system. Under the guidance of five principles, namely, connecting strong problem consciousness and reform direction, overall grasp of both the current situation and dynamic system, reinforcing both wisdom and diplomatic practices, balancing bottom line thinking and guarantees of comprehensive national power, and considering both humanism and cosmopolitan issues, China positively pursues theories and practices of diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which has successfully activated Chinese international relations theories, and contributed Chinese wisdom to international relations theories globally as well.
Northeast Asia as a group has not yet become a key cooperation area for the construction of the Belt and Road. At present, with the lowering of tensions in Korean Peninsula, the regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is expected to embrace new opportunities. However, atmosphere and conditions for cooperation still need to be further created by every country in the region. Promoting the construction of the regional cooperation along Russia, DPRK, ROK, Japan, Mongolia and the northeastern region of China, linking up the regional transportation lines and connecting the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Arctic shipping routes under construction, will help achieve connectivity and high-level development of economic and trade investment in Northeast Asia. At the same time, the regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is also faced with the challenges from investment environment and infrastructure. China, as an important advocate and participant of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, needs to focus on designing the path and pillars of the cooperation in order to promote the accelerated integration of Northeast Asia into the global value chain and jointly build an industrial cooperation corridor.
The economic cooperation between China and Russia needs financial promotion, but there is still much room for development in terms of depth and breadth of financial cooperation between the two countries. At present, local currency settlement and financing, infrastructure financing and portfolio investment are steadily advancing, and in some details, policies and mechanisms are required. In particular, it is necessary to carefully analyze the macroeconomic situation of Russia in order to be supported by capital and get stable returns on investment. For Russia, since the financing channels in Europe and the US have been restricted, how to attract Chinese capital through new financial instruments to achieve its own huge economic plan will not only have an important impact on Russia’s economic growth, but also support the BRI.
The development-oriented approach is the characteristic feature, institutional innovation, and comparative advantage of the Belt and Road Initiative. The development-oriented approach reflects Chinese experience and wisdom embodied in China’s reform and opening-up and China’s theory and practice in international economic law, which are different from Western experience and wisdom embodied in the neoliberal Washington Consensus and Western theory and practice in international economic law. The development-oriented approach and rule-oriented approach under the Initiative are complementary and supportive. The development-oriented approach under the Initiative and the Western rule-oriented approach are also complementary and supportive. A combination of the development-oriented approach and the rule-oriented approach will ensure that the Belt and Road Initiative can make steady progress. However, the development-oriented approach and rule-oriented approach under the Initiative should learn and draw lessons from but not copy the rule-oriented approach dominated by Western developed countries.
