Northeast Asia Forum is supervised by Ministry of Education of PRC, and sponsored by Jilin University. It is an authoritative academic journal, aiming to promote international cooperation, economic and trade, friendly exchanges, especially emphasizing on the strategic issues among Northeast Asian countries. Its scope covers studies in political, economic, historical, cultural, regional cooperation and international relations of Northeast Asia, and also lays stress on the development and new trends in all industries in Northeast Asian and Asia-Pacific areas.
The journal is included in CSSCI.
Editor-in-Chief Zhu Xianping
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Li Yingwu
Editorial Board Lowell Dittmer (U.S.); Lee Il-houng (ROK); Mikhail Titarenko (RUS); Davydov Andrey (RUS); Ogawa Yuhei(JAP); Wang Jisi; Zhu Xianping; Liu Jiangyong; Liu Debin; Li Junjiang; Li
The Soviet Union was a traditional land power. It started to develop naval forces, in consideration of the international situation, the global trend, and its security threats. With growing maritime strength, it gradually shifted from passive defense to proactive defense with an oceangoing offensive strategy taking place of the offshore defensive strategy. Driven by the offensive maritime strategy, it further strengthened the oceangoing naval construction to contend with the United States around the globe, which had consequently relieved its domestic strategic pressure and reinforced its national security. However, the Soviet Union sea power that centered on strong maritime forces, failed to sustain because of lacking economic initiatives. In addition, it became a pure consumer for precious resources without any economic compensation. Once its national power declined, it would decline. Aiming at building strong marine strength, China needs to learn from the Soviet Union and develop sea power in accordance with its national strength and strategic goals.
If the ban on the right to collective self-defense is lifted, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces would be able to deem it an attack against itself and strike back when the U.S. or other countries close to Japan is under attack. By lifting the ban, Shinzo Abe aims to achieve Japanese “normalization” through “breaking away from the post-war system,” and in a further attempt to “rejuvenate Japan” and transform it into a politically powerful state. But the exercise of the right to collective self-defense would exceed the “minimum required level of defense” in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Accordingly, unless the Constitution or its interpretation thereof is amended, such a move will be deemed unconstitutional. Due to the high threshold for amending the Constitution, Abe realized that his aim cannot be achieved overnight, turning instead to a salami-slice strategy which features mid-term gradual advancement and long-term solid struggle through piecemeal progress with continuous adaptation and compromise. In current stage, his goal is to conditionally exercise “right to restrictive collective self-defense” by amending the Constitution interpretation. Meanwhile, in order to dissipate the internal and external doubts on lifting the ban on the right to collective self-defense and attract support, on the one hand Abe put his action under the cloak of proactive pacifism in order to get whitewashed, while on the other hand deliberately defame China, discrediting it as the perceived enemy threatening Japan and the peripheral security. It is with no difficulty to imagine such a move will exacerbates the already deadlocked Sino-Japanese relations.
In July 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the two countries’ heads had a talk with each other, which is of great importance to not only the Sino-ROK relations but also the entire East Asia. Relations between the two countries were designated as a “mature strategic cooperative partnership.” The two sides had negotiations on how to make the strategic partnership more substantive and made a few achievements. They showed empathy for each other while objectively acknowledging the existing limitations in the bilateral relations, and made great achievements in negotiations concerning economic cooperation, public diplomacy and cultural ties in order to achieve long-term development of bilateral relations. However, in the more sensitive area of security cooperation, they have not made much progress. China firstly needs to avoid deepening competition and conflict with the United States over the peninsula issue, if it wants the ROK to enjoy leeway in the new-type Sino-ROK relations framework which is autonomous and independent of the ROK-U.S. relations. At the same time, in order for ROK to pay more attention to the nuclear issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to have a wider range of strategic options, China also needs to support and adjust its policy toward the ROK pertaining to the ROK-DPRK relations. South Korea also needs to get rid of the framework simply based on the ROK-U.S. alliance in considering security issues and do more creative and flexible thinking instead. Moreover, South Korea has to make more specific and sincere efforts to explore how to achieve the historic mission of national unity with as much cooperation and support from China as possible.
Since the 21st century, exchange rate protectionism has become the new contents and forms of U.S. protectionism against China. This seems to be caused by the American accusations that renminbi (RMB) exchange rate was undervalued and manipulated. However, these allegations are unreasonable, without any statistic support. This paper argues that interest group politics is an important micro-mechanism for the United States to put pressure on the RMB exchange rate; international monetary power, on the other hand, is an important macro-mechanism. China should take the following strategies to deal with the United States’ pressure: differentiating the protective interest groups in the United States and seeking support from the anti-protection interest groups in the United States; increasing autonomy in U.S.-China production, finance, trade, and knowledge structures; closely consulting, coordinating and cooperating with the United States government.
China and Russia have crucial national interests in the fields of environmental protection, resource exploitation, channel utilization, and military security in the Arctic region. As a result of different objective situations and subjective judgments of both countries, Russia’s interests are suggested to be satisfied and protected in order to realize China’s interests in the region. By and large, Russia, playing the dominant role, is in a strong position in the Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic region. In developing such relationship, China should build on the cooperation in Arctic environmental protection, focus on resources exploration, and furthermore make attempts to seek opportunities for cooperation in channel development and exploitation as well as military security. On the basis of Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, the two countries should actively propel the Arctic cooperation so as to achieve national interests on both sides.
The dispute between China and Japan over the East China Sea has been a continuous disturbance for bilateral ties. A research on the rise and fall of modern great powers suggests that the process of the rise of a nation roughly consists of three stages: “catching up,” “balancing,” and “overtaking.”[1] China is now at the “balancing” stage in the competition with Japan and the “catching up” stage in the competition with the U.S.-Japan alliance. In contrast to furious “marching strategy,” it is more beneficial for a rising state to employ the moderate “creeping strategy” in the strategic balancing and overtaking stages. Therefore, the East China Sea Strategy is suggested to be employed within the framework of the overall marine strategy, while the overall marine strategy in the framework of the overall rising strategy. In the “catching up” and “balancing” stages, the “creeping strategy” should be adopted in the following approaches: exchanging space for time, Waiting in the wings, developing further discussion by pressing, and achieving peace by military deterrence. In terms of specific countermeasures, the successful experience over the North Sea boundary dispute could be learned from the Nordic countries by China and Japan to jointly explore the East China Sea in the Northeast Asian Region with “Brent Model of the North Sea.”
Along with the profound changes in world structure brought by developing countries’ collective rising and developed countries’ relative declining, as well as its own long-term economic recession, Japan has to change its policy of “promoting diplomacy through economy” into one of “promoting economy through diplomacy.” With its failed attempt to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2005 as the turning point, Japan has realized the constraints of “equating the value of Africa with African voting support” and has thus given priority to the “economic value.” Against such background, on the TICAD platform and by means of ODA, Japan, while enhancing its aid to Africa, has furthered its efforts to encourage Japanese enterprises to “enter Africa” so as to increase its investments in Africa and promote Japan-Africa trade. In the meantime, Japan, in the spirit of mutual respect, has strengthened its role in Africa’s political and security affairs and tightened its relations with Africa. Nevertheless, Japan is faced with new challenges such as restraints imposed by Europe and the US, sluggish trade growth rate against Africa and the increasing influence of China upon Africa.
The Park Geun-hye administration reshapes its policies towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in terms of basic understanding of the DPRK, policy objectives, implementation principles, policy means, etc., indicating comparatively obvious strategic flexibility. It confirms the peaceful coexistence with the DPRK and promotes progressive unification on the one hand; while on the other hand prepares for the possible unification in response to the uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula situation. The Park Geun-hye administration adheres to its position of a nuclear-free DPRK, while implementing the separation of politics and economics, that of government and enterprises and that of business and aid in a flexible manner. It places an emphasis on developing mutual trust and will respond to the DPRK’s provocations uncompromisingly. Meanwhile, South Korea will continue its humanitarian aid, promote the normalization of the inter-Korean relations, enhance South Korea-U.S. alliance, develop Sino-South Korean strategic partnership and expand strategic space for flexible policies towards the DPRK. The key factors that influence the strategic flexibility are the DPRK’s change of attitudes, balance of domestic interest groups and relations between South Korea and its neighboring countries.
After Japan’s surrender, the U.S. military presence in South Korea led to the birth of the political system of post-war South Korea. Syngman Rhee failed to establish an effective political and economic order for the newly independent South Korea. Instead, he reemployed the officials of the Japanese-occupied period in order to oppress the left-wing progressive people, and resumed the old bureaucratic system and functions of the Joseon Dynasty. The democratic system transplanted from the United States soon took a deviant path. This American-nurtured political system profoundly affected the subsequent political system of South Korea, creating the conditions for the long military intervention in South Korea’s politics.
Renwen diplomacy [the term renwen in Chinese carries connotations of culture, ideology and people] becomes increasingly prominent in view of its international influence and competitiveness. Headed by President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government attaches great importance to carrying forward the traditional Chinese culture. China and the Republic of Korea (the ROK) are friendly neighbors, belonging to the same cultural sphere of Chinese character and Confucianism. In the long-term historical development and cultural exchanges, the two peoples draw on each other’s experience, seek mutual development and create spectacular cultural results. Since the establishment of China-ROK diplomatic relations 22 years ago, relations between China and the ROK have been strengthened and both sides have made frequent renwen exchanges. Owing to similar cultural tradition and mutual efforts, the two countries have made important achievements in renwen exchanges at both governmental and non-governmental levels. But meanwhile, there are such problems as mutual suspicion, lack of trust and asymmetrical communication for various reasons. Therefore, we should try to solve these problems by resorting to traditional Chinese wisdom such as “when acted on, it penetrates forth to all phenomena and events under the sky (gan er sui tong),” “harmony without uniformity (he er bu tong),” “keeping to the center (yun zhi jue zhong)” so that China-ROK renwen exchanges make due contributions to the smooth development of bilateral relations. The long-term goal of China-ROK renwen exchanges to establish a “renwen community” on the basis of the “renwen tie” that results from historical continuity and the same cultural origin. It will be a mechanism of harmony based on internal diversity and otherness, as well as a positive and creative system of integration.
