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【知识点链接】综合国力; 国际关系; 外交; 克什米尔

【摘要】文章回溯了近年来印度莫迪政府对华外交策略的表现和成效, 将莫迪政府的对华外交总结概述为“问题外交”, 其要旨在于印度把中印关系解构为若干具体问题, 就这些问题向中国提出诉求, 将中国对这些问题的回复是否符合印度的意愿作为衡量中国对印度尊重程度以及对中印关系重视程度的标准, 并以此为依据确定下一轮对华外交行动。文章总结了莫迪政府对华“问题外交”的基本特点, 即不关心整体状态、不担心中方报复、不考虑对等性质、不长期纠缠具体分歧的“四不”特征。进而, 文章讨论了印度对华心态和其“问题外交”策略之间的关联, 认为莫迪政府对华的“问题外交”策略源自于, 印度认为目前中印关系的实力对比难以在所有领域取得外交突破, 但在中印双边战略中, 中国投入资源的决心和意志明显弱于印度;与此同时, 印度预判国际环境对自己采取对华机会主义策略的形势有利, 并对未来两国实力横向比较持对己方更为乐观的预期。上述因素促使印度对华采取与其实力不相称的攻势策略。文章最后重点分析了莫迪政府对华“问题外交”思维对印度参与“一带一路”的态度的影响, 认为在印度对“一带一路”倡议的性质和中方意图心存疑虑的情况下, 中国能否消除印度的疑虑实际上并不取决于中国对印度的政策取向以及成效, 而是“一带一路”在南亚其他国家所取得的具体成果。

【关键词】 莫迪政府;印度对华政策;外交心态;“问题外交”;“一带一路”;


The Modi administration’s “issue by issue diplomacy” strategy towards China, and related attitudes towards the “Belt and Road” Initiative

YE Hailin1

(1.National Institute of International Strategy of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

【Abstract】This article reviews the practice and effectiveness of the Modi administration’s issue by issue diplomatic strategy towards China, summarizing the Modi administration’s approach as “issue by issue diplomacy.” Essentially, Modi’s approach has been to view China-India relations as a set of issues needing resolution, with India making demands towards China with respect to these issues. In turn, India evaluates whether China’s response to these issues gives India sufficient respect, and whether China places sufficient importance on Sino-India relations, which it takes into consideration in determining its next diplomatic moves against China. The article identifies that the “issue by issue diplomacy” of the Modi administration towards China can be summarized as having the following characteristics: no concern for the overall state of relations; no concern as to whether or not China responds with punitive measures; no consideration of reciprocity; no long-term consideration as of the principle of the “four nos” in assessing a difference of opinion on a specific issue. The article goes on to discuss the relationship between India’s attitude towards China and “issue by issue diplomacy.” It argues that the deeper reason as to why the Modi administration has adopted a strategy of “issue by issue diplomacy” is because India believes that based on status quo of the power balance between China and India, that it will be difficult to make diplomatic breakthroughs in all aspects of their relationship. On the other hand, when it comes to the strategies of China and India with respect to bilateral relations, China’s resolve and willingness to invest resources is weaker than that of India. At the same time, in India’s assessment, the international environment is favorable to India opting for an opportunistic approach to China, while India further sees that in the future there is good reason for optimism that the power balance may tilt in India’s favor. The result of the above is that India opts for an offensive strategy towards China that does not follow given India’s level of power and influence. In closing, the article considers the impacts of the Modi administration’s use of “issue by issue diplomacy” on India’s attitude towards participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. It argues that given the nature of India’s attitude towards the Belt and Road Initiative and India’s suspicions towards China’s intentions, the question of whether or not China can overcome India’s concerns depends not on the effectiveness of Chinese policies towards India, but on the specific outcomes of the Belt and Road Initiative in the other states of South Asia.

【Keywords】 Modi administration; India’s policy toward China ; diplomatic mindset; issue by issue diplomacy; Belt and Road;


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This Article



Vol , No. 06, Pages 24-47+150-151

December 2017


Article Outline



  • 1 Review of existing research literature
  • 2 The performance of the Modi administration’s issue by issue diplomacy against China
  • 3 The psychological basis and effect evaluation of the Modi administration’s “issue by issue diplomacy” against China
  • 4 Modi administration’s attitude towards the “Belt and Road” Initiative from the perspective of “issue by issue diplomacy”
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