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【摘要】为了促进地区经济发展, 中南半岛一度产生了为数众多的国际经济合作机制, 但在经过激烈的制度竞争之后, 最终能够在该地区经济社会发展及一体化建设中发挥重要作用的, 只有大湄公河次区域经济合作机制 (GMS) 和澜湄合作机制 (LMC) 等少数制度安排。这两个机制在成员构成、制度功能和运作方式上的共同点决定了二者存在客观的竞争关系。它们在主导力量及其投入力度、制度化水平、制度建设的根本目标和制度有效性方面存在差异, 又在一定程度上呈现出GMS的发展停滞甚至有所后退, 而LMC的影响力则迅速扩大的竞争现状。基于现实制度主义的分析框架, GMS和LMC各自的主导国——日本和中国在中南半岛实力地位的相对变化, 部分解释了两种机制当前竞争现状的成因。本文进而将制度参与国的选择纳入分析框架, 强调中南半岛五国的公共需求在两大机制下是否得到满足, 也对二者竞争关系具有一定的影响。从中日两国的战略定位与中南半岛五国的态度来看, GMS与LMC的竞争还将相持下去, 但这并不意味着制度间合作无法实现。对此, 中国一方面应在保障本国利益的基础上, 密切关注与对接中南半岛国家的需求, 确保LMC的吸引力与竞争力。另一方面, 可以推动两个机制的交流, 寻求合作的切入点, 实现GMS与LMC的良性竞争与制度相容。

【关键词】 大湄公河次区域经济合作机制;澜湄合作;国际制度竞争;现实制度主义;公共需求;中日关系;


【基金资助】 国家社科基金重大专项“‘一带一路’沿线国家信息数据库” (项目编号:17VDL001) 的部分成果;

From the GMS to the LMC: international institutional competition on the Indochina Peninsula

LUO Yifu1

(1.School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.)

【Abstract】In order to promote regional economic development, there are a large number of international economic cooperation mechanisms in the Indochina Peninsula once, but after fierce institutional competitions, only a few institutional arrangements including the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) can finally play important roles in the economic and social development and integration of the region. The common ground of the two institutions in terms of membership, institutional function and operational mode determines the objective competitive relationship between the two. They differ in the leading forces of the institution and their investment into the institutions, institutionalization level, the fundamental goal of institutional construction and institutional effectiveness. To a certain extent, the competition state quo between the institutions is that the development of the GMS is stagnant and even regressed while the influence of the LMC expands rapidly. Based on the analytical framework of realistic institutionalism, the relative changes in power structure between Japan and China, the leading countries of the GMS and the LMC respectively, in the Indochina Peninsula, partly explain the causes of the current competition pattern of the two mechanisms. This paper further incorporates the choice of participating countries in the institutions into the analytical framework, emphasizing that whether the public needs of the five countries in the Indochina Peninsula are met under the two major mechanisms also has a certain impact on the competitive relationship between the two mechanisms. In terms of the strategic positioning of China and Japan and the attitude of the five countries in the Indochina Peninsula, competition between the GMS and the LMC will continue, but this does not mean that inter-institutional cooperation cannot be achieved. In this regard, China should pay close attention to catering to the needs of the countries in the Indochina Peninsula on the basis of safeguarding its own interests to ensure attractiveness and competitiveness of the LMC, and moreover, it can promote exchange of the two mechanisms, seek the entry point of cooperation, and achieve benign competition and institutional compatibility between the GMS and the LMC.

【Keywords】 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation; Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC); international institutional competition; realistic institutionalism; public need; Sino-Japanese relations;


【Funds】 National Social Science Fund of China (17VDL001);

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    [76]. (76) That is, with political security, economic and sustainable development, and social humanities as the three pillars of cooperation, and connectivity, capacity cooperation, cross-border economy, water resources, agriculture and poverty alleviation as priority directions. [^Back]

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    [81]. (81) For example, while formulating a plan for the construction of domestic railway infrastructure, upgrading the existing railway infrastructure, and implementing domestic railway connection, Thailand’s Prayuth government has implemented the key project of the LMC , the construction of the China-Thailand Railway, to connect with national infrastructure projects in the region. See Liu, Z. (ed.) Report on the Development of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2017) (澜沧江—湄公河合作发展报告 (2017)). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 224 (2018). [^Back]

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This Article


CN: 11-5370/D

Vol 35, No. 06, Pages 119-156

November 2018


Article Outline


  • 1 The status quo of international institutional construction in the Indochina Peninsula
  • 2 Japan’s “big country ambitions” and the rise of the GMS
  • 3 China’s “charm offensive” and the birth of the LMC
  • 4 Public needs of the five countries in the Indochina Peninsula and the evolution of the institutional competition
  • 5 Conclusion
  • Footnote