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中东地区的大国博弈、地缘战略竞争与战略格局

吴冰冰1

(1.北京大学外国语学院阿拉伯语言文化系 100871)

【摘要】冷战后美国在中东地区居于支配性主导地位, 其中东政策深刻影响中东地缘战略竞争和战略格局。俄罗斯借助地区伙伴, 以中东变局为契机、以叙利亚为主要抓手, 成功恢复和扩大了地区影响力, 但其优势局限于中东部分国家和局部地区。欧洲缺乏独立自主的中东政策, 总体上追随美国的中东政策, 其影响力有限。中东地区当前存在四组主要的地缘战略竞争, 并缺乏有效的地区合作机制, 地缘战略竞争无法得到有效协调和管控, 从而出现日趋激烈的态势。围绕大国博弈和地缘战略竞争, 在中东地区出现了以伊朗为核心的什叶派阵营, 以土耳其、卡塔尔为核心的亲穆兄会阵营, 以及以沙特、阿联酋和以色列为核心的反伊朗、反穆兄会阵营。特朗普支持反伊朗、反穆兄会阵营;俄罗斯依托什叶派阵营, 拉拢亲穆兄会阵营;欧洲采取不选边站和相对超脱的立场。大国博弈和地缘战略竞争, 导致在叙利亚、伊拉克、也门、黎巴嫩、利比亚等国出现尖锐对抗甚至爆发内战或武装冲突, 使这些国家成为地缘战略竞争的焦点。在焦点国家, 以黎巴嫩真主党和伊拉克人民动员武装为代表的次国家武装行为体的作用凸显, 在地缘战略竞争中正在发挥关键作用, 成为改变中东战略格局的重要因素。

【关键词】 中东;大国博弈;地缘战略竞争;战略格局;叙利亚内战;

【DOI】

The great power game, geostrategic competition and strategic pattern in Middle East

WU Bingbing1

(1.Department of Arabic Language and Cultures at School of Foreign Languages, Peking University 100871)

【Abstract】The United States has assumed a dominant position in the Middle East after the Cold War, whose Middle East policy would exert profound influences on the geostrategic competition and strategic pattern in the place. Russia, seizing the opportunity of the Middle East crisis and taking Syria as its major focus, has successfully restored and expanded its regional influence. Yet its advantages are restricted within several countries and regions there. In short of independent Middle East policies, the Europe generally follows that of the US and generates limited influences. Four major geostrategic competitions currently exist in the Middle East. And since there is no effective regional cooperation mechanism to efficiently coordinate and manage those competitions, tensions are escalating. Three camps have emerged due to the great power game and geostrategic competitions, i.e. the Iran-backed Shia camp, Turkey- and Qatar-led pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp, and the anti-Iran and anti-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) camp supported by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel. The Trump administration supports the anti-Iran and anti-MB camp, Russia, while relying on the Shia camp, is drawing over the pro-MB camp, and the Europe adopts a neutral and detached attitude. The great power game and geostrategic competitions also have driven sharp confrontations, and civil wars and armed conflicts have broken out in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Libya, making those countries the focus of geostrategic competitions. As the representative sub-state armed actors among these countries, the Hezbollah faction in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq are playing greater roles in the geostrategic competition and in changing strategic patterns in the Middle East.

【Keywords】 Middle East; great power game; geostrategic competition; strategic pattern; Syria civil war;

【DOI】

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    Footnote

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This Article

ISSN:1003-3386

CN: 11-5370/D

Vol 35, No. 05, Pages 42-70

September 2018

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Article Outline

Abstract

  • 1 Post-Cold War Middle East policy of the US
  • 2 Middle East policies of Russia and the Europe
  • 3 Geostrategic competitions in the Middle East
  • 4 Strategic patterns in the Middle East
  • 5 Conclusion
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