The international relations in AI era: increasing reform and inequality
【Abstract】The advancements in deep learning algorithms help Artificial intelligence (AI) steer toward a new round of growth. With a massive increase in algorithm and computer processing speeds, AI has achieved technological industrialization and become the key driver of the fourth industrial revolution. The rapid development of AI will profoundly influence international relations. First, AI has been directly involved in the strategic decisions and international military interactions, further widening the gap among international actors and upsetting the balance of power. Second, automated production brought by AI will change the modes of economic and social production around the world and propel structural reforms of power at the distribution level inside international actors, thus triggering significant systemic influences on the international system. Third, the development of AI will change human modes of thinking in the new era and new ideological trends will gradually come into being as a result of continues debates. AI leads human to a new stage facing reforms and inequality, and China will also meet with her new opportunities and challenges.
【Keywords】 artificial intelligence (AI) ; deep learning; strategy game; military system; automated production; changes of international relations;
(Translated by ZHANG Yan)
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. ① Theoretically, deep learning belongs to connectionism school of AI, and some scholars of artificial neural networks also use this concept, but this classification method is also controversial. Different theoretical approaches in AI are shown in Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm:How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World.
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. ② Ibid., p.815.
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. ① Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, pp.16–17.
. ② The program was completed by a team led by Andrew Ng, who taught at Stanford University. Afterwards, Andrew Ng worked for Google and Baidu, and made significant contributions to the advancement of global AI technology. Andrew Y.Ng, et al., “Autonomous Inverted Helicopter Fight via Reinforcement Learning”, in M.H.Ang and O.Khatib, eds., Experimental Robotics IX, STAR 21, March 2006, pp.363–372.
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. ② Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security”, pp.18-20.
. ③ Ibid., pp.15–18.
. ① For the relationship between AI and hierarchical governance structure, please refer to Jia, K. & Jiang, Y. Chinese Public Administration (中国行政管理), (10): 40–45, (2017).
. ① Executive Office of the President, “Artificial Intelligence, Automation and the Economy”, December 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-IntelligenceAutomation-Economy.PDF. For the status quo of AI replacing labor in automated production, see Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang and Owain Evans, “When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts”, Artificial Intelligence, May 2017, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08807 v2.pdf .
. ② For example, the “Industry 4.0” strategy proposed by Germany, the “Made in China 2025” strategy proposed by China, and the “Industrial Internet” strategy proposed by the United States are all such responses.
. ③ Georg Graetz and Guy Michaels, “Robots at Work”, CEPR Discuss Paper No.DP10477, March2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2575781
. ④ Mark Purdy and Paul Daugherty, “How AI Boosts Industry Profits and Innovation”, Accenture Research, 2017, http://img1.iyiou.com/Document/2017-07-11/Accenture_AI_Industry_Growth_Full_Report.pdf
. ① Executive Office of the President, “Artificial Intelligence, Automation and the Economy”, p.2.
. ② Please refer to Martin Ford, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. The Chinese version: 机器人时代: 技术､工作与经济的未来, Wang, J. & Niu, Y. (trans.), Beijing: CITIC Press, 239–244 (2015).
. ③ Executive Office of the President, “Artificial Intelligence, Automation and the Economy”, p.2.
. ① According to the prediction in Wuzhen Index: Global AI Development Report (2016), AI in the short term will focus on autopilot, health care, security, e-commerce retail, finance, education, and personal assistants. The full report is available at: http://www.199it.com/archives/526338.html
. ② The Chinese version: 机器人时代: 技术､工作与经济的未来, Wang, J. & Niu, Y. (trans.), Beijing: CITIC Press, 235–238 (2015).
. ③ Mark Montgomery, “Fear of Artificial Intelligence VS.The Ethics and Art of Creative Destruction”, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/06/fear-artificial-intelligence-vs-ethics-art-creative-destruction
. ① Senior scientists in AI increasingly prefer large enterprises to universities. The top scientists in the field of deep learning, such as Jeffrey Hinton, Vladimir Vapnik, Jan Lechon, Leon Bhutto, Andrew Ng, Wang Haifeng, and Li Feifei have long served in major Internet companies. The seven Sino-U.S. super Internet companies mentioned above have also been dubbed as seven “black holes” in the field of AI because of their agglomeration effect of capital, data, and talent.
. ① The interpretation of the community of scientists is available in [US] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Jin, W. & Hu, X. (trans.), Beijing: Peking University Press, (2003).
. ① For the origins of conservatism and progressiveism, please refer to Liu, J. Conservatism, Beijing: Oriental Press, (2014); Li, Q. Liberalism, Beijing: Oriental Press, (2015); Li, Y. Intellectuals and Reform: New Theory of American Progressive Movement, Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, (2010).
. ① For the main features of super AI, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence:Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford University Press, 2014.
. ② The Lourdes Movement is a mass movement, destroying traditional machinery, initiated by the traditional textile industry in the early 19th century during the British Industrial Revolution. After the 1990s, a new generation of philosophical trends against modern technology emerged, which is also named New Lutheran movement since it has close ideological origins with the early Lutheran movement but hopes to limit the use of new technologies to prevent negative effects on automation and digitization. In the era of weak AI, the New Lutheran movement is expected to receive more support. It may become a major social trend of thought.
. ① For related issues of “unconditional basic income”, see Phillipe Van Parijs, Basic Income:A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy, Harvard University Press, 2017; Karl Widerquist, ed., Basic Income:An Anthology of Contemporary Research, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
. ① In 2016, the U.S. government released three reports on AI and proposed a comprehensive plan to promote the development of AI technology. National Science and Technology Council, Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Subcommittee, “The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan”, October 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf; Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council, Committee of Technology, “Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence”; Executive Office of the President, “Artificial Intelligence, Automation and the Economy”. The British government’s relevant policies for AI industry can be found in: Government Office for Science, “Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and Implications for the Future of Decision Making”, November 9, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566075/gs-16-19-artificial-intelligence-ai-report.pdf.
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. ② For the main content of the “Internet +” AI Three-year Action Implementation Plan, see http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201605/t 2016 0523_804293.html
. ③ For the content of the New Generation AI Development Plan, please refer to http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm