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Cross-border capital flow management and global financial governance

TAN Xiaofen1 LI Xingshen1

(1.School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics)

【Abstract】This paper analyzed the importance, volatility, cyclicality and inter-relationship of cross-border capital flows across countries against the backdrop of financial globalization. It found that cross-border capital flows played an important role in boosting economic growth and triggering economic crisis, and there was a lack of collaboration frameworks across countries for responding to cross-border capital flows. The paper introduced a major country-level capital flow management framework. Then from the perspective of global financial governance, the paper analyzed the political economy of regulating cross-border capital flows during three periods and found that we were facing a complex era with overlapping and conflicting regimes. It constructed a global financial regulatory framework composed of international financial institutions for enhancing the collaborations across institutions. It also provided some proposals on international financial institution reforms, international monetary system reforms and changes in Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN). Last but not the least, the paper analyzed China’s contribution in terms of cross-border capital flow management and global financial governance in recent years and put forward the “Chinese approach.”

【Keywords】 cross-border capital flow management; global financial governance; global financial regulation structure; international financial institutions;

【DOI】

【Funds】 National Natural Science Foundation of China (71850005)

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This Article

ISSN:1007-0974

CN: 11-3799/F

Vol , No. 05, Pages 57-79+6

September 2019

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Abstract

  • 1 Policy framework of cross-border capital flow management
  • 2 Cross-border capital flow management from the perspective of global financial governance
  • 3 “Chinese approach” in cross-border capital flow management and global financial governance
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