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Brief

Chinese Journal of Management Science is supervised by Chinese Academy of Sciences, and sponsored by Chinese Society of Optimization, Overall Planning and Economical Mathematics, and Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences. It aims to promote the theory, method and application in the field of management science in China, and to encourage the improvement of the whole research level of management science and academic exchange worldwide. The scope covers planning and optimization, investment analysis and decision-making, production and management, and supply chain management. The Journal is included in CSSCI.
Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief
Cai Chen

Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Xu Baoguang, Li Jianping

Editorial Board
Qi Jianxun, Ma Chaoqun, Wang Junbo(HK), Fang Sucheng(USA), Chi Hong, Hua Zhongsheng, Da Qingli, Xu Baoguang, Liu Xiaohui(UK), Liu Sifeng, Liu Xiangguan, Chen Shou,

Differential game study on industry-university-research synergetic R&D strategy of industrial generic technology

MA Yonghong;LIU Haijiao;LIU Qing

Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,Vol 27,No. 12

This article examines the industrial generic technology collaborative research and development of a single research institution (university, research institute) and a single enterprise that are completely rational and have complete information for the conflict between the cooperation motives and behavioral goals caused by the heterogeneity of innovation resources in universities, research institutes, and enterprises during the collaborative R&D of industrial generic technology. Research institution is mainly responsible for basic research of industrial generic technology and company is mainly responsible for the application and development of industrial generic technology. In order to motivate the enthusiasm of research institutions for research and development, enterprises provide research institutions with a certain percentage of R&D investment subsidies. The Hamilton-Jacoby-Berman equation (HJB equation) is used to investigate the respective behaviors of universities, research institutes and enterprises in three cases: Nash non-cooperative R&D game, Stackelberg master-slave R&D game and cooperative R&D game through constructing the differential game model of industry-general-technology and industry-university-research cooperation research and development. The degree of optimal R&D effort, the optimal R&D income and the total optimal R&D income of both sides are analyzed, the effect mechanism of R&D subsidy on industry-university-research collaborative research and development of industrial generic technology is discussed, and the coordination mechanism among the subjects of industry-general-technology industry-university-research collaborative innovation under the dynamic framework is seeked. Through the comparison of the three game results, the following conclusions are drawn: R&D investment subsidy, as an incentive strategy, can promote the research and development efforts of research institutions, the research and development income of both sides and the total R&D income of both sides. Besides, In the case of cooperative game, the degree of respective R&D effort, respective R&D income and total R&D income of both parties are better than that of non-cooperative case, and there is a threshold value of income distribution coefficientα, which can realize the Pareto improvement of individual income of both sides. Specific content as follows: (1) In the case of Nash non-cooperative game and Stackelberg master-slave game, the degree of R&D effort of enterprises does not change. In the case of Stackelberg master-slave game, the degree of R&D effort of research institutions is significantly higher than that of Nash non-cooperative game. The raised level is equal to the coefficient of R&D investment subsidy, which indicates that R&D investment subsidy, as an incentive mechanism, can improve the R&D effort of research institutions. In the case of cooperative game, the degree of R&D effort of enterprises and research institutions is better than that of non-cooperative game. (2) In the case of Stackelberg master-slave game, the R&D income of enterprises and research institutions are better than that of Nash non-cooperative game, that is, when enterprises provide R&D investment subsidies to research institutions, the R&D returns of enterprises and research institutions are improved. (3) In the case of cooperative cooperation game, the total R&D revenue of enterprises and research institutions is superior to that of Stackelberg’s master-slave game. Under the Stackelberg master-slave game, the total R&D revenue of enterprises and research institutions is better than that of Nash non-cooperative games. In order to coordinate the cooperative R&D behavior of industry generic technology between research institutions and enterprises, the range of income distribution coefficient α is discussed and analyzes the revenue coordination mechanism of industry-university-research collaboration R&D of industrial general technology is analyzed. Finally, the results of theoretical derivation are verified by randomly setting parameters within the assumed condition of the article.

Cooperative mechanism of double revenue sharing in the product and service supply chain

LI Xin;YU Hui

Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,Vol 27,No. 12

In the context of supply-side structural reform, the supply side presents a new transition from a single product to the package of products plus services. The product and service supply chain aims to improve supply quality level and efficiency through upstream-downstream cooperation. In practical case, App Store, an on-line application service website, provides application download services for consumers and meets the consumer market demand through a comprehensive solution of terminal intelligent product plus APP download service, which expands and extends the value chain of companies. However, in 2017, Apple closed the WeChat reward function with the dominant position of the system platform, and further charged other social applications reward function for 30% service fee. Thus, when the supply chain value creation and income distribution are separated, the conflict between manufacturers and service providers would be inevitable. Based on the realistic background, the importance of the cooperation mechanism is explored for the supply chain operation efficiency, and the function mechanism of the profit-sharing cooperation mechanism on the operation decision was proposed. It provides the operational foundation for the cooperation of product and service supply chain under the characteristics of diversified organizational structure. The non-cooperative product and service supply chain model was constructed, and then the single or double benefit sharing method was introduced to discuss the influence of cooperation on supply chain decision-making. Finally, the improvement space of supply chain operation efficiency under different cooperation mechanisms was revealed through mathematical deduction and numerical analysis. When the supplier acts as the leader of the supply chain and participates in the Stackelberg game with the manufacturer, the manufacturer and the service provider use the revenue-sharing contract (the revenue sharing factor as λ) to perform the revenue distribution, and this is defined as the single revenue-sharing cooperation mechanism. Similarly, dual revenue sharing means that supply and manufacturer consider using a revenue-sharing contract (the revenue sharing factor as λ s& m) to enhance operational collaboration, while manufactures and service providers still use a revenue-sharing contract to distribute income. This article constructed a product and service supply chain cooperation model, which described the diversity of organizational structure characteristics. The key finding is that there is the upside down phenomenon between service scale and supply chain efficiency, and double revenue-sharing cooperation could improve the supply chain efficiency. Suppliers are motivated to set high wholesale prices to capture profits of the product and service supply chain under the single revenue-sharing cooperation. Although the supply chain cooperation mechanism could improve the consumer surplus, there is erosion of consumer surplus in the single revenue-sharing mechanism.

Dynamic evaluation method based on TOPSIS and gray correlation degree and its application

WU Feimei;LI Meijuan;XU Linming;BI Junli

Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,Vol 27,No. 12